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In critical discourse surrounding the poetry of William Wordsworth, it has 
become generally acceptable to describe the course of the poet’s career by means of a 
theory of “decline.”  In its most common form, this theory argues that Wordsworth’s best 
poetry was written during one “Great Decade” (1798-1807)—an isolated epoch of 
prolificacy and genius.  His subsequent works, it is argued, neither surpass nor equal his 
initial efforts; the course of his career after 1808 may be best described in terms of 
declivity, ebb, and decline.  
 Due to its ideological complicity with the very texts it engages, and due to its 
construction as a “myth” of criticism, the theory of decline ultimately becomes a 
reductive premise that precludes understanding Wordsworth’s apparent downtrend as a 
complex but explicable process. This study therefore seeks to provide a critical 
explanation for the process of decline so often observed in Wordsworth’s poetry. In 
essence, I contend that the perceptible downtrend in Wordsworth’s verse is the direct 
consequence of continuous, career-long processes of revision or self-editing. This self-
editing took two forms: First, the explicit form, whereby Wordsworth actually emended 




poetry, to amend his self-image by constructing an autobiography tailored to fit an 
idealized poetic identity. 
This analysis thus reveals and explicates Wordsworth’s possible motives for 
revision—the fluctuating demands made upon the poet by the poet himself. Because 
these demands represent the operative (if unstable) principle underlying specific textual 
changes, one may infer from their character the reasons why Wordsworth’s later poetry 
suffers in revision. By attending to the process whereby earlier verse was continually 
revised in order to fit a conceptual or poetic context for which it was not originally 
intended, I demonstrate how the actual substance of Wordsworth’s poetry was 
compromised or attenuated through a reductive (re)appropriation of its own materials.  
Unlike many critics, I do not treat Wordsworth’s revisions as the signifiers of 
some external change. Instead, my approach keys upon the conflict between 
Wordsworth’s efforts to realize a stable poetic identity and the representational and 
rhetorical limitations of poetic form, particularly with regards to autobiography. Drawing 
on the work of Susan Wolfson, Paul de Man, and Harold Bloom, I argue that 
Wordsworth’s revisionary practices are motivated by an agonistic process best described 
as “autobiographical anxiety” or the “‘anxiety of influence’ turned inward.” Ultimately, I 
conclude that Wordsworth’s decline was the consequence of an overarching ethic of 
composition which, because it privileged revision as a means of changing not only poetry 








In book three of the 1805 version of The Prelude, William Wordsworth—poet, 
narrator, and explicit subject of the poem—pauses to survey his progress: 
     And here, O friend, have I retraced my life 
     Up to an eminence, and told a tale 
     Of matters which not falsely I may call 
     The glory of my youth. Of genius, power 
     Creation, and divinity itself, 
     I have been speaking, for my theme has been 
     What passed within me. . . . 
     Yet each man is a memory to himself, 
     And therefore, now that I must quit this theme, 
     I am not heartless; for there’s not a man 
     That lives who hath not had his god-like hours . . . (1805 3.168-74, 189-92) 
 
Despite the apparent finality of the lines above, and despite their almost epitaphic 
summation of a theme which, according to the poet, has now been “told” and must be 
“quit,” abandoned, and allowed to pass away and die, this particular “eminence” is only 
preliminary. We are only halfway to the crossing of the Alps in Book VI, ten books and 
thousands of lines removed from the climactic ascent of Mount Snowdon. The pinnacle 
above is but one of a series of interconnected peaks which punctuate Wordsworth’s 
sprawling autobiographical epic. One should not assume, however, that this moment’s 
anteriority precludes any relevance to the whole: ultimately, each eminence prefigures 
and contains its successor. The theme which Wordsworth seemingly quits does not perish 
but proliferates. Thus, while the poet’s childhood, like his “Residence at Cambridge,” 
may have passed, the concerns evident within that narrative—“the glory of . . . youth,” 
“genius, power, / Creation, and divinity itself”—are perpetually exigent. In The Prelude, 





reconstruct the past are genuine but always mediated. “Each man,” he declares, “is a 
memory to himself.” 
 For Wordsworth, memory is consistently the site and source of solace. 
Nevertheless, this moment, by acknowledging the distance between past and present 
selves, reveals his deeply ambivalent attitude toward retrospection. Delving into the past 
may be a restorative process, but it also produces an awareness of what has been lost. 
“Each man is a memory to himself,” removed from “the glory of youth,” and while the 
poet may profess faith in poetry’s capacity to bridge that gap and recoup former glory, his 
veneration of those “god-like hours” clearly implies profound doubt as to whether they 
can be equaled, much less surpassed.  
 The operative terms of this passage—binaries of youth and old age, past and 
present, loss and restoration—not only indicate many of the poet’s primary concerns, but 
also predict, with almost uncanny accuracy, the character of subsequent criticism. It is not 
simply that critics have treated these subjects in analysis--this is a given. Rather, a 
considerable body of critical discourse has actually internalized and reduplicated these 
terms, tropes, or patterns of thought, employing or applying them as frames for 
understanding the poet and his career. Wordsworth’s own modes of reflection, the 
conceptual apparatus of his consummately autobiographical verse, have structured the 
way critics think about his poetry. Just as the poet distinguishes between early and late 
selves, the critic divides the poet and his career into early and late phases; just as he 
speculates on the resplendent glory of youthful, “god-like” hours, the critic argues that 
his best work falls within one golden “Great Decade”; and just as the poet worries about 





critic affirms that Wordsworth’s later career is characterized by decisive decline in poetic 
power.  
 The “Great Decade” and its corollary, the theory of decline, have become 
pervasive presences in Wordsworth criticism. Yet despite their ubiquity, and despite 
notable efforts to justify—or reject—the implied binary view of the poet, the 
compositional processes behind the poet’s alleged decline remain relatively unexplored. 
The goal of this study is therefore to provide a critical explanation for the process of 
decline so often observed in Wordsworth’s poetry. I will uphold the widely accepted 
(though certainly not undisputed) judgment that his early poetry is of greater quality, but 
will qualify this assertion by describing how the quality of those initial poetic products 
was attenuated or otherwise compromised. Ultimately, I seek to demonstrate that the 
perceptible downtrend in Wordsworth’s verse is the direct consequence of continuous, 
career-long processes of revision or self-editing. This self-editing took two forms: First, 
the explicit form, whereby Wordsworth actually emended his poetry; and second, the 
implicit form, whereby Wordsworth sought, through his poetry, to amend his self-image 
by constructing an autobiography tailored to fit an idealized poetic identity. 
While a considerable amount of my argument will rely upon a comparative 
analysis of different versions or permutations of poetic texts, the point of the enterprise 
goes beyond simply tracking textual changes in order to pronounce one “better” than the 
other. Instead, analysis should reveal and explicate Wordsworth’s possible motives for 
revision—the fluctuating, shifting, and evolving demands made upon the poet by the poet 
himself. Because these demands, which constitute the idealized poetic identity referenced 





one may infer from their character the reasons why Wordsworth’s later poetry suffers in 
revision. The last portion of my argument confronts therein the ultimate contingency and 
uncertainty of all aesthetic judgment. Nevertheless, by attending to the process whereby 
earlier verse was continually revised in order to fit a conceptual or poetic context for 
which it was not originally intended, one can sufficiently demonstrate how the actual 
substance of Wordsworth’s poetry was compromised or attenuated through a reductive 
(re)appropriation of its own materials. The diminishment of Wordsworth’s poetic 
products was not (as many have speculated) a consequence of flagging “inspiration,” or 
changing political perspectives, or the inevitable entropy of aging, but the effect of a 
continuous, overarching ethic of poetic composition which, because it privileged revision 
as a means of changing not only poetry but the poet himself, allowed artistic self-
consciousness to eventually become a self-defeating agent. The process which would lead 
to Wordsworth’s “decline” was present from the beginning, but the same revisionary 
ethic which initially yielded his best verse gradually became a burden too heavy for his 













Chapter 1:  
Wordsworth’s “Great Decade” and the Theory of Decline 
 Literary critics, although methodologically self-aware to a fault, are often hesitant 
to acknowledge their complicity with the texts they engage. We write on or about a given 
author or text, admitting and even celebrating our dependence upon literature, but 
nevertheless impose a boundary between our texts and their subjects, thereby creating 
Criticism as a genre apart, possessed of its own ethics, rhetoric, and methods. Although 
necessary and productive, this severing of critic and textual object often leads us to 
overlook the ways in which criticism engages in discursive practices either similar or 
analogous to those found within “primary” or “literary” texts. This is especially true of 
those works deemed “creative,” for their discursive methods and purposes appear wholly 
dissimilar. Criticism judges, analyzes, and interprets; its purpose is exposition, not 
expression. Whereas the novelist, essayist, or poet composes a literary product, critics 
write in order to delineate how such products can or ought to be read. 
 Yet readings are narratives in their own right: the critic, like the author, crafts 
stories—meta-narratives whose plots center upon encounters with other texts and, 
through them, their creators. While we may question, reflect upon, or otherwise analyze 
these narratives with greater frequency and rigor, critical texts also function by means of 
trope, metaphor, and symbol. The various theoretical developments of the past sixty 
years, which have been especially attentive to the manner in which we construct and are 






 While the literary qualities of criticism are eminently discernable in individual 
texts, the most pronounced evidence of these qualities emerges when critical discourse 
coalesces around specific works or authors. In such instances, what was originally the 
argument of an individual may, by means of repetition (whether positively or negatively 
construed), accrue enough weight, notoriety or influence to become part of the collective 
narrative, the “story” which defines an author or work and inflects subsequent readings. 
When applied to especially prominent authors and texts, the process becomes almost 
mythopoeic: like any sub-culture, criticism creates a narrative in order to understand the 
relevance and function of an iconic presence. Even when such a myth acts as a locus for 
iconoclasm, even when it occasions heated debate (as any “conventional” idea in 
criticism will), its power remains intact; for in the very act of engaging the icon, the critic 
will inevitably confront the myth. Criticism is not immune to the potency and efficacy of 
ideas which one might readily call, in another context, fictions. Just as an artificial world 
or a character may help one to understand “objective” realities, so may a constructed idea 
or narrative serve to illuminate a text or career. Without any implicit judgment regarding 
its validity, what is often described as a theory might well be called an enabling fiction.  
 Precisely such a fiction informs critical assessments of the poetic career of 
William Wordsworth, whose capacious influence and continuing importance to literary 
studies are, regardless of one’s opinion of his work, undeniable. Critical conversation 
surrounding his work remains vital, variegated, and manifold. Nevertheless, one finds 
within that polyvocal, sustained dialogue certain axiomatic continuities—ideas which, 
though certainly not new, “yet exist with independent life” and “know no decay” 





narrative which seeks to explain an oft-cited aesthetic judgment concerning the disparity 
between his early and late poetry. In brief, it has become generally acceptable, when 
discussing the course of Wordsworth’s career, to propound a theory of “decline.”  In its 
most common form, this theory argues that, while he enjoyed a relatively long and active 
career, Wordsworth’s  best poetry was written during one “Great Decade” (1798-
1807)1—an isolated epoch of prolificacy and genius.  His subsequent works neither 
surpass nor equal his initial efforts, and thus, despite his substantial public reputation 
later in life, the course of his career after roughly 1808 may be best described in terms of 
declivity, ebb, and decline.   
Despite its probable familiarity, the claim is striking, especially in terms of 
proportions. Unlike the majority of his Romantic compeers, Wordsworth lived a long life: 
born in 1770, he did not die until 1850—long enough to outlast the very literary 
movement which he had helped to found. Nevertheless, he was almost continually active 
as a poet, perhaps publishing even more during his late career than he had during the 
lauded early phase. To propose that Wordsworth’s career is defined by one decade is 
therefore to assert that forty-two years of composition were more or less fruitless. The 
Great Decade theory isolates and elevates a considerable body of verse, but it 
concomitantly excludes an incredible amount of poetry. Wordsworth, according to the 
narrative, suffered from a forty-two year drought: he was in decline longer than Keats, 
Shelley, and Byron were alive.  
                                                           
1 Although critics differ slightly in their dating of the Great Decade (some shifting its beginning to 1797 
and some extending it until 1810), the range here mentioned is representative of majority opinion. Because 






Granted, assent to this idea is by no means unanimous; even those critics who 
hold to such an assessment do not do so unequivocally. Permutations of the stock 
narrative abound, and one would be hard-pressed to locate a critic of Wordsworth who 
did not offer his or her own exception to the proposed parameters. Nevertheless, the 
essence of the myth—that Wordsworth’s poetry suffered from a terminal downtrend—
remains intact and vital. The Great Decade has become a latent but potent rubric within 
Wordsworth criticism. Contemporary scholars, whatever the basis of their approach to or 
interest in Wordsworth’s poetry, often cite or allude to the phenomenon directly, as if it 
were tantamount to established fact; and even when the concept is not so explicit, one 
might detect its influence in a critic’s aesthetic judgments or selection of texts. Indeed, 
many would think it strange to deem the narrative of Wordsworth’s decline a “theory” at 
all, for the essential aesthetic preference it expresses has been integrated into the 
discipline as a whole. Susan Wolfson points out, for example, that the “story of 
[Wordsworth’s] decline” has led to a critical climate wherein 
      earlier and  earliest versions gain praise for their vitality and fidelity to the best            
     “Wordsworth.” Their recovery is the rationale of Cornell’s expensive and elaborate    
     editions: “Wordsworth’s practice of leaving his poems unpublished for years after  
     their completion, and his lifelong habit of revision . . . have obscured the original,  
     often the best, versions of his work.” (75) 
 
The judgments of one publication and its editors do not necessarily represent the views of 
an entire discipline. Nevertheless, the very fact that the field’s most rigorous exemplum 
of Wordsworth scholarship is dedicated to the “recovery” of  “original” poetic products 
which have supposedly been “obscured” by “a lifelong habit of revision”2 demonstrates 
the extent to which the idea has become an axiom of critical practice.   
                                                           
2 The Cornell editors’ decision to characterize Wordsworth’s revisions as a “habit”—a word which carries 





 Unlike many critical concepts which have rather diffuse, uncertain geneses, the 
myth of Wordsworth’s Great Decade may be traced to a single passage from an early 
critical work, Matthew Arnold’s 1879 introduction to his selection of Wordsworth’s 
poetry. The relevant paragraph, which merits being quoted in full, reads as follows: 
     Wordsworth composed verses during a space of some sixty years; and it is no  
     exaggeration to say that within one single decade of those years, between 1798 and  
     1808, almost all his really first-rate work was produced. A mass of inferior work  
     remains, work done before and after this golden prime, imbedding the first-rate work  
     and clogging it, obstructing our approach to it, chilling, not unfrequently, the high- 
     wrought mood with which we leave it. To be recognized far and wide as a great poet,  
     to be possible and receivable as a classic, Wordsworth needs to be relieved of a great  
     deal of the poetical baggage which now encumbers him. (Arnold 6) 
 
Here, one finds the essence of the Great Decade myth: a comparative aesthetic 
assessment of Wordsworth’s early and late poetry ending in the judgment that his corpus 
can be (or in Arnold’s case, must be) organized by means of reference to a binary 
dynamic of vitality / decline—or, in Arnold’s terms, of a “golden prime” followed by a 
“clogging . . . obstructing . . chilling” mass of “poetical baggage.” However, the most 
striking element of this passage is Arnold’s rhetoric, which simultaneously invokes 
classical archetypes, seasonal motifs, and an entire complex of Romantic metaphors of 
poetic expression and inspiration. For example, the phrase “golden prime” is poly-
connotative: it both contains an explicit reference to the archetypal “golden age” of 
antiquity (associated with innocence, youth, passion, liberty in the absence of 
encumbrance) and, by means of “prime,” activates a polysemous chain of associations 
intimately linked to ideas of youth; seasonal fecundity, precedence, and order (e.g., 
spring); and primitive or primal states of existence. The verbs “clogging,” “obstructing,” 
and “chilling,” though undoubtedly intended to add rhetorical flourish and force to 





described as Romantic “metaphors of expression”—complexes of imagery and diction 
which, in seeking to describe the process of composition or the essence of poetry, rely 
heavily upon “physical analogy” (Mirror 47). Wordsworth himself famously described 
poetry as “the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings” (Prose 1:126), thereby 
figuring the poet as “a container—a fountain or natural spring, perhaps—from which 
water brims over” and creating a schema wherein “the internal [is] made external” 
(Abrams 47, 48). Arnold’s verbs of blockage and lethargy obviously embody the negative 
form of the same tropological tradition. They signify not only the lack of “overflow” but 
also its inverse: stagnant or uninspired expression, the poetic equivalent of death.  
 Youth as a “golden prime,” old-age as deterioration unto death: these are familiar 
terms telling perhaps the most common of stories. Yet the very fact that Arnold’s 
statement relies upon such generic registers of meaning begins to explain why the Great 
Decade is more than a quantitative assessment of a poet’s career. On the surface, it has 
the stark, localized character of an aesthetic judgment—and this is probably as Arnold 
intended it to be: simple, declarative, and resolute. But when considered as a function of 
the language which it elicits, the Great Decade becomes a richly symbolic gesture, the 
external signifier of those myths which still inform how we read poetry and poets. 
Notice, in the passage above, that it is not the poet who Arnold claims was “obstructed” 
but the “reader’s approach” to the poem; not Wordsworth whose “high-wrought mood” 
was spoiled but the reader’s that was “chilled.” This shift in subjects, though subtle, 
exposes the dialogic relationship between Wordsworth’s poetic language and Arnold’s 
critical response. The latter works within and through the former, appropriating its 





gains an idiom but concomitantly re-inscribes the limitations of poetic logic upon its own 
discourse.  
 Of course, Arnold’s reliance upon Romantic epistemology and “metaphors of 
expression” is neither atypical of nineteenth-century criticism nor, by the standards of 
that time, problematic. Romanticism was both a literary and a theoretical phenomenon; 
its greatest practitioners were its most discerning and influential critics. One cannot cite 
Arnold’s reliance upon Wordsworthian tropes of composition without simultaneously 
recognizing that he was heir to a critical tradition which arguably began with 
Wordsworth’s 1800 Preface to Lyrical Ballads. 
 However, Arnold’s proximity and debt to Romantic theory does not interpose a 
strict barrier between his concept of Wordsworth’s Great Decade and later iterations of a 
theory of decline. Contemporary criticism has questioned, modified, and restructured the 
argument but never completely disavowed the central proposition or its premises. 
Consequently, one finds that even relatively current evaluations of Wordsworth’s career 
retain a genetic resemblance to the theory in its first form. Given criticism’s tendency to 
iconoclasm, as well as the sheer range and depth of theoretical developments since the 
late nineteenth-century, such longevity seems uncanny: any “myth” which supports an 
aesthetic judgment, it stands to reason, would have long ago been supplanted by 
rigorously qualified “objective” criteria. 
 The key to understanding the enduring import of the myth lies in a consideration 
of how it has continually acted as an enabling fiction. Ideas do not survive in an 
inherently skeptical climate unless they are practicable; whether they are accurate or 





Wordsworth’s decline has endured because it provides an interpretive schema well-
adapted to the specific exigencies of the surrounding critical conversation.  
The exigencies that have not only preserved but amplified the relevance of the 
Great Decade stem from two interrelated critical developments which defined the 
parameters of twentieth century Wordsworth scholarship. The first consists of the 
redemption of a text Arnold deemed part of Wordsworth’s “poetical baggage,” The 
Prelude. Whereas many in the late nineteenth century had, like Arnold, deliberately 
isolated and elevated the youthful Wordsworth of Lyrical Ballads at the expense of the 
more philosophically-inclined, mature poet manifest in later works such as Home at 
Grasmere, The Excursion, and The Prelude, critics in the early twentieth century began to 
reverse this paradigm, arguing, as Tim Milne explains, “for Wordsworth’s pre-eminent 
position in the canon, based on the value . . . of poems such as The Excursion and The 
Prelude” (30).  This argument for the precedence of what A.C. Bradley calls the 
“Wordsworth of the yew-trees” over “the Wordsworth of the daffodils” became one of 
the most salient features of twentieth century criticism (qtd. in Milne 31). Largely thanks 
to Bradley’s efforts to construct “a hermeneutic ‘shrine’ around The Prelude,” the poem 
has become the central text in Wordsworth’s corpus—an almost obligatory locus of study 
and scholarship (32). 
 At first, the new ascendency of The Prelude appears to contravene the aesthetic 
primacy granted to Wordsworth’s early poetry. The text of The Prelude upon which 
Bradley based his arguments was, after all, first published in 1850—forty-two years after 
the poet’s supposed fizzling. Of course, it was well-known that the actual writing of The 





example, begins by citing “the public curiosity” which for “well nigh thirty-four years . . .  
has been excited by the knowledge that there existed in MS. an unfinished poem, of very 
high pretensions, and extraordinary magnitude, from the pen of the late . . . poet-laureate 
of Britain” (Norton 547-48). Yet because the actual text of The Prelude was perceived as 
a product of Wordsworth’s late career, critics did not typically construe it as an early 
work. However, this perception was forever altered, or at least complicated, by Ernest de 
Selincourt’s 1926 publication of parallel texts of the 1805 and 1850 versions of The 
Prelude. Here, for the first time, The Prelude became both early poem and late 
publication: de Selincourt seemed to have revealed, in the very act of placing an 
“original” text next to the poem’s standard incarnation, that the work considered 
Wordsworth’s crowning achievement had in fact achieved substantial genesis at the crest 
of the poet’s early phase of poetic “genius.” The reaffirmation of Arnold’s original thesis, 
albeit according to different standards, was already implicit in the dynamic represented 
on the page: youth versus old-age, genius as opposed to stagnation, vitality ending in 
decline. 
 The tacit assertions of de Selincourt’s volume become explicit within his 
extensive introduction to the text. Although he attempts to maintain a balanced 
perspective, even occasionally admitting the superiority of the later poem with such 
brusque pronouncements as “No one would doubt that the 1850 version is a better 
composition” (lvii), de Selincourt’s ultimate verdict is unmistakable: The 1805 Prelude is 
the “original text” composed by a poet in “the fullness of his powers”; the 1850 text, one 
of the “more finished but less inspired writings of his later years,”  attests to the poet’s 





much literalness” the superiority of the young Wordsworth, “the obvious truth,” de 
Selincourt writes, is “that what is greatest in Wordsworth belongs to a single decade 
(1798-1807)” (lix).  
 One should not hasten to accuse de Selincourt of unscholarly bias: his 
introduction, despite its clear preference for the 1805 Prelude, is hardly polemic; and his 
comparison of the 1805 and 1850 versions attempts to retain, for the most part, the 
balanced approach appropriate to a work of textual scholarship. Of course, other readers 
have disagreed: in a much later defense of the 1850 Prelude, Jeffrey Baker describes the 
ambivalence present in de Selincourt’s introduction (noted above) as “an astonishing 
piece of self-contradiction” and proceeds to locate in that contradiction, which he calls 
“the de-Selincourt paradox,” the “origins of the 1805 cult” (“Great Prelude Debate” 22, 
emphasis added).3  The paradox Baker cites is the result of a complex clash between 
scholarly standards, individual aesthetic judgment, and a modified but still potent version 
of the Great Decade myth. The introduction attempts to be objective, fair, and balanced in 
its presentation of the texts, but ultimately that objectivity is overridden by the happy 
concurrence of the author’s personal judgments and the now-pervasive narrative of 
Wordsworth’s career. In a somewhat oblique manner, the presence of the myth is 
announced even before de Selincourt’s introduction begins by means of the 
frontispiece—a tinted pencil portrait of Wordsworth. Purportedly drawn in 1805, the 
portrait presents an image not of the venerable poet laureate but of a youthful 
Wordsworth. In the Preface, de Selincourt glosses the frontispiece as follows: “This is the 
                                                           
3 Seemingly mystified by the existence of such a paradox, Baker attempts to explain its source by 
describing “the situation in human terms”:  “How often,” he asks, “does a literary scholar burst upon the 
academic world and announce: ‘I have just discovered a hitherto early version of a well-known poem by X, 





only known portrait of the poet in his prime, and its suitability as an illustration to this 
volume needs no emphasis” (x). The image thus becomes the icon.  
 As the portrait and explication make clear, de Selincourt’s version of the myth 
retains those basic paradigms established by Arnold. Yet the presentation, operative 
terms, character, and rhetoric of the myth have been altered. The most obvious change is 
a curtailment of explicitly metaphorical language. For example, de Selincourt does not 
appropriate Arnold’s corporealized description of poetic afflatus (e.g., clogging, 
obstructing), but instead relies upon a vocabulary consisting of such seemingly innocuous 
terms as “inspiration,” “creativity,” and “powers.” At once more direct and more abstract, 
such rigidly self-contained parameters seem to permit increasingly analytic distinctions 
regarding the object or content of an aesthetic judgment, including the distinction 
between “craftsmanship” and “creativity” which underlies the statement that so infuriated 
Baker, “that the 1850 version is a better composition” (de Selincourt lvii, emphasis 
added). Yet this apparently distilled language does not abandon metaphor so much as it 
compresses a complex of images and ideas. The same figures one finds in Arnold are 
therefore present in de Selincourt, but in a drastically more compact form.  
Accordingly, the most important alteration to the myth consists of the 
development of a newly resonant set of descriptors which, though ensconced in the same 
conceptual frame as Arnold’s metaphors, manage to contain the myth in a more 
unobtrusive, self-effacing rhetoric. De Selincourt’s text repeatedly deploys such phrases 
as “true disciple,” “sincerity in style,” “the voice of the authentic Wordsworth,” “original 
thought,” “excrescences of a manner less pure” (lx, lxii, emphases added). Though 





and purity all share a common conceptual antecedent: the notion that what is “true” or 
“authentic” in Wordsworth’s poetry is both limited to a specific range or type of 
expression and (because it is concealed, distorted, or corrupted) must be actively sought 
out. By these means, we discover that de Selincourt perpetuates Arnold’s notion of 
“poetical baggage”: if the critic is to isolate and preserve the “authentic Wordsworth,” he 
or she must purge his corpus of the detritus left by decline.  
The preferred texts have changed; the terms have shifted; the critic is no longer so 
unequivocal and brash in his judgments. Nevertheless, the myth endures, retaining—and 
in some cases, even amplifying—its genetic relationship to the Romantic tropes from 
whence it sprang. De Selincourt is not at all unique in this regard; even the work of his 
colleague and successor, Helen Darbishire—whose essay “Wordsworth’s Prelude” 
undertakes a much more rigorous analysis of the differences between the 1805 and 1850 
texts—reveals the same pronounced debt to Romantic thought:  
     What matters to us is not so much to understand the experience as to realise it, not so    
     much to solve the mystery as to see where it lies. This is what the early Prelude helps  
     us to do. In it Wordsworth told the inner workings of his mind as nakedly and  
     truthfully as he could; and the changes most to be deplored in the later text are those  
     which overlay or obscure the naïve immediate expression. They generally mar the  
     poetry; they always disguise the truth. (qtd. in Milne 33) 
 
Darbishire’s “naïve immediate expression” clearly draws upon the sense of poetic 
propinquity manifest in Wordsworth’s own “spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings” 
(Prose 1:126). According to both Wordsworth and Darbishire, poetry must maintain a 
correspondence or closeness to the object or occasion which it addresses; by these means 
it remains a “true” expression, an authentic feeling, and a sincere transcription of the 
original experience. The terms are nearly synonymous because they originate in the same 





creative process(es) than the applied terminology of a separate, subsequent critical 
tradition.  
 After de Selincourt, the critical conversation surrounding Wordsworth’s poetry, 
and especially The Prelude, was forever altered. The existence of two distinct versions of 
the work which had become, after Bradley, “the essential living document for the 
interpretation of Wordsworth’s life and poetry,” both complicated and enriched the field, 
offering critics an entirely new means of discerning “the curve of Wordsworth’s poetic 
development” (de Selincourt xix, Milne 32). Yet the phenomenon which enabled so much 
valuable work also polarized readers, for even those who were led to view The Prelude as 
a poem in process felt compelled, as de Selincourt had, to declare one version superior to 
the other. For this reason, the theory of Wordsworth’s decline became a more relevant 
and forceful idea than it had ever been. The Great Decade myth already promoted a 
dichotomous perspective on Wordsworth’s career; now, it could be grafted upon a new 
frame. The Prelude—two poems turning upon the same axis yet representing two visions, 
two versions of the poet—was for many the concrete illustration of Wordsworth’s 
decline. Even as critics probed the differences between the texts and sought to synthesize 
more thorough conclusions, the myth was reified, reiterated, and embodied in and 
through The Prelude.  
 The conflict or polarity implicit in the first parallel text edition of The Prelude 
became such a staple of Wordsworth studies that even by 1984, sixty years after the 
original publication of de Selincourt’s edition, critical conflict was still lively enough to 
warrant a formal debate concerning the relative merits of the 1805 and 1850 versions. 





conversation between some of the most prominent critics in the field demonstrates how, 
despite the myriad and manifold theoretical developments of the later twentieth century, 
the essential terms of the debate have endured. Proponents of the 1805 Prelude thus tend 
to begin with the type of statement which we will, by now, find wholly familiar: 
     [T]he revisions demonstrate to me that the great poet in Wordsworth survived only in  
     flashes after 1807, leaving behind an artist adrift, who consistently altered his early  
     work for the worse, not solely because the Muse had abandoned him, but because he  
     had abandoned the revolutionary programme of 1800, as set forth in the great Preface.    
     (Fruman 7) 
 
For Fruman, Wordsworth’s later poetry thus represents not only a diminishment or 
decline, but a somewhat deliberate—and therefore more damning—abandonment or 
betrayal of the “revolutionary programme” which shaped the poet’s great decade. His 
argument for the aesthetic primacy of the 1805 Prelude does not depend so much on 
figures of impersonalized inspiration (as announced by the inversion of agency above, 
wherein Wordsworth is not abandoned but abandons) as on a demonstration of the ways 
in which Wordsworth the laureate corrupted Wordsworth the ephebe. Herbert 
Lindenberger, who also speaks in defense of the 1805 version, reaches a similar 
conclusion, deeming the revisions a “betrayal of the image of man that dominates the 
poem” (2). Both critics provide ample justification for their judgments. Lindenberg, for 
example, cites the vitality of the early version, its willingness “to take risks” and “[strike] 
out boldly into new areas for poetry” (4)—qualities he finds preferable to the stylistic and 
semantic pieties of the 1850 version. Fruman echoes these sentiments, declaring the later 
revisions “act[s] of uniformity against the creative mind,” but also provides a rigorous 
analysis of the destructive, reductive principles underlying Wordsworth’s changes to the 





in his own time and ours . . . work well enough in practical expository composition, but 
are hopelessly inappropriate to the work of a great poet, and especially one as strange, 
eccentric and original as Wordsworth” (7). As a result, the 1850 Prelude reveals “a poet 
engaged in tinkerings which derive from the decayed vocabularies of thought and 
response which actually precede the linguistic adventures of his great years” (8). By 
1850, Fruman asserts with pithy force, “Wordsworth was no longer a great architect, but 
had become an interior decorator” (8). 
 Despite the apparent efficacy of their analytic criteria, both critics’ arguments 
ultimately depend upon a highly contentious aesthetic and ideological axiom: the 
authority of the “original” Wordsworth. This is by no means a new development: 
Arnold’s “golden prime,” de Selincourt’s “sincerity” or “authenticity,” and Darbishire’s 
“naïve immediate expression” all reference the same idea, a notion of primacy which is 
both the fount and the primary expression of the myth. Yet for later critics—whose 
enterprise has been complicated by increasingly divergent theoretical assertions 
concerning the stability of texts, the precise role of the author / poet, and the nature of 
reading or interpretation—the matter of textual authority is at once more problematic and 
more urgent. In other words, the difficulty of declaring one text “authoritative” acts as an 
impetus to do precisely that. For this reason, while Fruman and Lindenberger are 
perfectly willing to concede their judgments’ contingency and characterize their support 
of the 1805 Prelude as subjective “preference,” they nevertheless work assiduously to 
qualify and cement the authority of the early Wordsworth. For them, “original” becomes 
a doubly potent concept signifying both what is prior—and therefore deserves priority—





 As a result, the crux of dissent between proponents of the 1805 Prelude and those 
who prefer the 1850 version is the question of textual authority. Summarizing the 
position of the latter group in the debate’s closing remarks, Robert Barth seizes upon the 
evocation of bildung in the Prelude’s subtitle, “the growth of the poet’s mind”: 
supporters of the 1850 text, he proclaims, “argue for the priority of the later experience, 
because it is later, because it is a development out of earlier reflection experience” (36). 
Thus, according to Barth and his colleague Jeffrey Baker, the 1850 Prelude is the 
“authoritative text” both because it represents the “final” text directly authorized by 
Wordsworth and because it is a culmination or completion of the poem’s own 
developmental schema. Though this line of argument seems rather doctrinal, and though 
one can easily object to such a developmental narrative on the grounds that it assumes 
“growth” to be a strictly teleological process, the model of authority proffered by Barth 
and Baker is ultimately no less contentious than the alternative, antithetical schema 
proposed by Lindenberger and Fruman. Both models privilege an extreme and both invert 
the other’s parameters: once again, we find that Wordsworth and his poetry are subject to 
a bifurcating narrative of youth and old age, originality and finality, vitality and 
eminence. The participating critics’ descriptions of the Prelude as a “poem in process” 
may complicate the discussion, but their polarized premises continue to reaffirm a binary 
conception of poet and poem. Paradoxically, the parameters of the myth are affirmed 
even as its thesis is denied.  
 Yet because they object to what has become the standard view of Wordsworth, 





“originality” has affected criticism and scholarship. “Since Wordsworth’s opinions 
supposedly grew more orthodox as he grew older,” Baker explains, 
     one can, by applying the doctrinal standard, develop a chronological reflex as a   
     substitute for critical labor. Earlier is better because earlier is more orthodox, more     
     spontaneous, more authentic. But one does not need to establish these qualities, one     
     only needs to date the poem, or the passage, or the revision, and the judgment is pre- 
     programmed. (22) 
 
Baker’s diagnosis is accurate. The heart of the problem with the Great Decade myth and 
its corollary—the narrative of Wordsworth’s decline—does not lie in the aesthetic 
judgment it encourages but in the fact that this judgment has become a “doctrinal 
standard” or “chronological reflex” which is often applied without further thought, 
without sufficient justification, and without ample consideration of how or why such a 
process of decline might have taken place. To revise Baker’s phrasing, the myth or 
narrative has become the substitute for a critical explanation of Wordsworth’s career. 
The narrative in and of itself is not pernicious, and myths are not necessarily false. (Quite 
the contrary, a myth, even a myth of criticism, often represents a sound judgment or a 
point at which judgments converge.) But if such narratives or myths are allowed to 
harden into dogma, they become impediments to thought. Instead of acting as enabling 
fictions, they silence discussion and short-circuit genuine critical inquiry.  
Yet the discussion cannot end here. The status of the Great Decade theory as 
myth, that myth’s proliferation in critical discourse, and the consequent “chronological 
reflex” are but symptoms of a more fundamental problem evident in the preceding 
analyses: the tendency of criticism, when it confronts the apparent disparity between 
Wordsworth’s early and late work, to adopt and rely upon patently Romantic tropes of 





neglected to explain their judgments and/or preferences for particular works or versions 
of those works: both Lindenberger and Fruman, for example, provide thorough, 
convincing arguments to support their claim that the 1805 Prelude is superior to the 1850 
version. But when one moves beyond the comparison of specific texts and comes to the 
heart of the matter—the overarching aesthetic thesis that is the Great Decade—
explanations are either hasty, perfunctory, or completely absent. Thus, in the majority of 
cases, Wordsworth’s decline is deemed a self-evident fact; the ebb of his “poetic powers” 
stands as an unsubstantiated assumption. When a rationale is present, its matter and 
manner are almost formulaic: Wordsworth’s later poetry lacks “originality” “sincerity,” 
or “authenticity”; after 1807, the poet somehow lost his “inspiration,” that creative energy 
which animated the early verse; because this phenomenon became even more pronounced 
as the poet aged, it must be connected to the corrosive influence of time, which in 
depriving Wordsworth of his youth left him subject to the stagnation of old age.  
Admittedly, this is a rather harsh synopsis. Nevertheless, it amply demonstrates 
how the Great Decade theory, when deployed, activates a series of ideas about the nature 
of poets and poetic production which prevent or supplant more rigorous inquiry into the 
antecedents or process(es) of Wordsworth’s alleged decline. The specifically Romantic 
genealogy of these ideas requires further explanation. Let us, then, consider yet another 
iteration of the Great Decade theory. In Genius: A Mosaic of One Hundred Exemplary 
Creative Minds, Harold Blooms writes the following: 
     Everything that matters by Wordsworth was written in one decade, 1797-1807.  The  
     last forty-three years of his poetry were lamentable. . . . Wordsworth’s genius burned  
     to the socket when he was thirty-seven. . . . But, with Wordsworth, the end was    
     implicit always in the origins of his genius: a visionary radiance fiercely resplendent    
     in his childhood, but then fading into the light of common day.  If you invest  





     eventually betrays the child who loved her. (377) 
 
Although Bloom is often considered something of a critical apostate, the passage above is 
strikingly representative of the dominant means of explaining (or failing to explain) 
Wordsworth’s decline. Like most critics, he does not describe the downtrend as a process 
but as the abrupt and premature absence, lack, or loss of poetic inspiration. The terminal 
date of the bracketed decade is inscribed upon Wordsworth’s career as if it were his 
epitaph: the great poet, the “genius” died in 1807; all written afterward was but a 
posthumous echo. This description implicitly privileges a tropological model of 
inspiration as afflatus—an impersonal force (wind, fire, or current) which acts upon the 
poet’s imagination, stimulating creativity and poetic production. The poet, in such a 
schema, is but the vessel that overflows or the lamp that burns: he is utterly subject to and 
dependent upon a fount or flame external to himself, an intangible impetus to creativity 
which can simply depart without warning or apparent cause, leaving him bereft and 
“burned to the socket.” This latter phrase suggests another dimension of the master-
metaphor: the fire, both source and Promethean forge of vital verse, feeds upon and 
consumes its bearer, whose capacity to sustain the flame diminishes as he ages. Youth is 
therefore the fuel and necessary prerequisite for poetry which sustains a “visionary 
radiance”; advanced age weakens the vessel, whose former resplendence dwindles to a 
low, common light.  
 Initially, Bloom’s argument appears to be wholly dissimilar from other critics’ 
references to the Great Decade. However, the obvious discursive differences between this 
and more “critical” approaches only conceal their common antecedents: Bloom’s heavily 





full context of such terms as “originality,” “inspiration,” or “creativity” and magnifying 
the metaphors of mind which, regardless of the critic’s intent, inhere in any discussion 
which characterizes the loss of poetic capacity as a sudden and largely inexplicable 
phenomenon.  
 But how is it possible that such ideas could enter into and inform critical 
discourse without the critic’s knowledge? How could blatantly figurative concepts of 
inspiration, creativity, and poetic production infiltrate a discipline so relentlessly attentive 
to its own language and methods?  
First, one must take into account the sheer difficulty of quantifying the operative 
terms and processes. Both the production of poetry and the character of those 
mental/artistic faculties which either enable or inhibit “inspired” composition constitute 
irreducibly complex subjects. When confronting these issues, the critic is therefore more 
likely to rely on ideas or tropes which convey the sense that poetic processes are 
mysterious or ineffable (because this is indeed his or her impression). Second, one must 
recognize that many critics have been more concerned with either the consequences of 
the decline (how it actually affected the poetry) or the frame it offers for understanding 
Wordsworth’s career (the myth as an enabling fiction) than with the process of decline 
itself. Given these possibilities, some might argue that the perpetuation of metaphors of 
mind is accidental. 
 Yet, “accident,” however construed, does not suffice to explain critics’ 
pronounced dependence upon tropological (and unelaborated) models of poetic process 
as a means of explaining Wordsworth’s decline. The theory and the myth which is its 





collateral concerns. Instead, the perpetuation of the myth, and the dominant (albeit 
inadequate) explanation of the process it describes, are direct consequences of the highly 
problematic critical phenomenon first described by Jerome McGann in The Romantic 
Ideology. “[T]he scholarship and criticism of Romanticism and its works,” he writes, “are 
dominated by a Romantic ideology, by an uncritical absorption in Romanticism’s own 
self-representations” (1). This absorption has occurred because “[w]hen forms of thought 
enter our consciousness as forms (or ‘structures’) of feeling—which is what takes place 
through poetry and art—the forms threaten to reify as ideology in the secondary 
environment of criticism” (13). 
McGann’s argument offers a solid explanation for most critics’ failure to move 
beyond reductive rationale when explicating Wordsworth’s decline. Criticism has been 
limited by a complex of internalized forms of thought and feeling—an ideology which, 
given its perspective on creativity and the process of composition, resists “non-poetic” 
descriptions of the poet’s work. The evidence of this complicity between Romantic 
poetry and its criticism emerges most clearly in their shared lexicon. Once again, 
Bloom’s brash statement discloses a process more subdued in other critical texts. For 
example, when he claims Wordsworth’s “end was implicit always in the origins of his 
genius,” Bloom defines those origins as “a visionary radiance fiercely resplendent in his 
childhood, but then fading into the light of the common day”—a statement which 
unabashedly appropriates the consummately Romantic imagery and diction of 
Wordsworth’s own “Intimations” ode, which also laments the loss of a “radiance which 
was so bright” and a “vision spending” as it “fade[s] into the light of common day” 





 Of course, one cannot deny that Bloom has used this language with full 
recognition of its source, just as one cannot deny the critic an abstract language in which 
to couch discussions of such difficult concepts as “genius.”  Yet the operative point is: If 
we continually define Wordsworth in Wordsworth’s own terms, thus locating genius 
outside of the poet and conceiving of it as an inspired quality possessed and not an actual 
artistic capacity enacted, we will be led to assume that his ability to compose superior 
poetry was only an intermittent brilliance which “burned to the socket” without warning 
or concrete cause.  However attractive such an assessment may be to those of us who 
venerate individuals seemingly “electrocuted by the divine fire,” it ultimately becomes a 
rationalization, a reductive premise that precludes understanding Wordsworth’s apparent 


















Autobiography and Poetic Self-Consciousness: The Causes and Costs of Revision 
In an 1814 letter to Robert Pearce Gillies, Wordsworth offers his young admirer, 
an aspiring poet, the following advice: 
     do you simply mean, that such thoughts as arise in the progress of composition should  
     be expressed in the first words that offer themselves, as being likely to be most  
     energetic and natural? If so, this is not a rule to be followed without cautious  
     exceptions. My first expressions I often find detestable; and it is frequently true of  
     second words as of second thoughts, that they are the best. (Wordsworth, Letters    
     3:179) 
 
Despite the obvious contradiction between the principle expressed above and 
Wordsworth’s now canonized “poetics of inspiration and spontaneity,” one is initially 
inclined to accept this statement as a relatively commonplace, perfectly sound bit of 
counsel (Bennett 12). Wordsworth’s experience had taught him what all writers 
eventually realize: composition is a laborious, often recursive process, and one cannot 
always rely upon first drafts or first words. Romantic myths of divinely-inspired poetic 
composition, however attractive, are simply not practical in application; neither the 
contemporary critic nor the Romantic poet would deny the necessity of “second 
thoughts” and “second words.” Ultimately, revision is an essential part of composition—
so utterly common, in fact, that it seems a wholly unspectacular phenomenon.  
Yet as critics have long recognized, Wordsworthian revision is anything but 
typical. The sheer volume of his alterations, rewritings, and versions; the frequency with 
which he applied himself to either editing or completely re-conceiving texts; the duration 
of his efforts with individual poems, many of which would be constantly reworked over 
the (considerable) span of his career—all are indications that, for Wordsworth, revision 





introduction to his edition of Wordsworth’s collected works, Ernest de Selincourt writes 
that “it is probable that no poet ever paid more meticulous or prolonged attention to his 
text” (qtd. in Leader 651). His assessment, already grounded in decades of editorial 
experience, has been borne out by subsequent efforts in textual scholarship. One need 
only glance at the immensely detailed apparatus in any volume of the Cornell 
Wordsworth to get a sense of the scope of the poet’s revisions. His manuscripts are 
typically “disfigured with interlining, crossing out, and marginalia” (Gill, Wordsworth 
191); they exist in multiple, usually contradictory versions; and substantial passages are 
frequently either protean or peripatetic, lacking a set form or location. Further, the 
complexity manifest in alterations to a single poem may be compounded by more holistic 
revisions, as a text is either subsumed by or extracted from a longer work. In 
Wordsworth’s corpus, virtually no poem has a fixed, stable identity. Change—perpetual 
change—predominates. 
Even more curious, however, is the manner in which Wordsworth revised, and the 
effects of that process upon him. As Stephen Gill recounts in William Wordsworth: A 
Life, for Wordsworth there was little or no distinction between the physical act of putting 
a poem to paper and the introduction of further changes: “copying out and fresh 
composition went on simultaneously,” as if the poet could not tolerate a “final” version, 
even when the hand that copied (usually that of his sister, Dorothy, or wife, Mary) was 
not his own (81). Further, the act of writing and the labor of revision also negatively 
affected Wordsworth’s physical well-being, eliciting “a series of physical, psychosomatic 
and psychological symptoms – including bad eyes, headaches, bowel complaints, chest 





Such symptoms might be dismissed as the rather commonplace effects of excessive stress 
or strain were it not for the strangely immediate relationship between illness and writing. 
For example, in a letter to Thomas de Quincey, Wordsworth divulges that he has 
     a kind of derangement in my stomach and digestive organs which makes writing  
     painful to me, and indeed almost prevents me from holding correspondence with any  
     body: and this (I mean to say the unpleasant feelings which I have connected with the  
     act of holding a Pen) has been the chief cause of my long silence. (Wordsworth,  
     Letters 1:453) 
 
This is neither an isolated observation nor an affected excuse for lapsed communication: 
the correlation between writing and illness would be noted, repeatedly, by Dorothy and 
others in close proximity to the poet. 
While Wordsworth’s aversion to textual fixity doesn’t amount to a neurosis, his 
demonstrable need to constantly revise does lend credence to the claims that the poet’s 
attention to his texts was “obsessive” and that, for him, revision was nearly a 
“compulsion.” All poets and all writers revise, but few have spent so much energy and 
effort in the service of “second thoughts.” Consequently, Wordsworth’s tendency to 
revision is one of the defining aspects of his poetic career, and the problems stemming 
from that revisionary dynamic constitute some of the most productive and contentious 
loci of critical discourse.  
For these reasons, the question of how to read Wordsworth’s revisions and the 
effort to understand the course and shape of his poetic career are inextricably intertwined. 
One cannot read “Wordsworth”—either the poet or the poetry—without entering into and 
engaging a complex network of discursive relationships: every reading represents a 
choice between texts, and every text a potentially different vision (and version) of its 





agnosticism which is sometimes necessary if one is to accomplish anything else), many 
have chosen to confront the matter directly. The “Great Prelude Debate” is hardly an 
isolated critical event, for the issues which crystallize therein have a discursive history 
that extends both before and beyond that particular conversation. 
For the sake of clarity, critical responses can be divided into two (admittedly 
unwieldy and codependent) categories. First, there are the theoretical and ethical debates 
elicited by both the practices and findings of textual scholarship. Initiated by de 
Selincourt’s watershed parallel text edition of The Prelude, this body of criticism both 
attempts to justify or rebuke editorial procedures and confronts what is at stake in those 
procedures—including, most particularly, matters of textual authority. The principal 
question here is: Which Wordsworth do we (or should we) read, and whose Wordsworth 
is that anyway—the editor’s, the author’s, or some joint creation of the two? In this 
species of criticism, Wordsworth’s revisions act primarily as an antagonistic catalyst for 
debate and are treated as problematic phenomena, obstacles which must be either 
negotiated or at least accounted for in the acts of reading and interpretation.  
The second principal artery of discourse concerned with Wordsworth’s revisions 
encompasses biographical, historical, or new historicist approaches. While issues of 
textual authority are still at stake in such readings (and can often figure prominently in 
analysis), the role and function of Wordsworth’s revisions shifts therein: they become 
evidence—external signifiers of changes in the poet, his historical context, or the 
ideological complexes informing either the poet or his product. Critics writing in this 





political and religious opinions, the way his poems engage and incorporate history, or 
shifts in modes of poetic self-representation. 
Yet despite the vast breadth of approaches which have been brought to bear upon 
Wordsworth’s revisions, one may still locate certain salient trends—themes, as it were, 
which unify the critical corpus. Susan Wolfson accurately summarizes these themes in 
the following: 
     In one long-standing tradition, revisions are read teleologically: they clarify an  
     original intent and refine its “final” expression, each stage conveying the discipline  
     and progress of a poet’s mind. This evolutionary model is not the only one however,  
     and The Prelude—perhaps more than any nineteenth-century text—poses a strong  
     resistance to it. For many there is a devolutionary tale: the revisions seem less to  
     signify improvement than a hardening sensibility, the story of decline, default, and  
     anticlimax that gets told about the career as a whole; correspondingly, earlier and  
     earliest versions gain praise for their vitality and fidelity to the best “Wordsworth.”  
     (Formal 101) 
 
Obviously, Wolfson’s survey is a simplification: many degrees and shades of the above 
perspectives have been entertained, and critics (like Wolfson herself) have often sought 
to self-consciously interrogate the hermeneutics exercised in readings of Wordsworth. 
Nevertheless, an overwhelming majority of interpretations align with one of the two 
models. Textual scholars, depending on how they allocate editorial authority, tend to 
fixate on either the “original” versions of poems or supposedly authorized, “final” 
versions. Critics in the other mode are less explicit in their alignment, but the master-
narratives are nonetheless active.  For example, the common effort to track the changes in 
Wordsworth’s politics—usually with an emphasis on the “revolutionary to conservative” 






These diametrically opposed readings represent yet another iteration of the 
bifurcated image at the core of the mythico-critical construct of the “Great Decade.” Each 
perspective may privilege and enshrine a different “Wordsworth,” but both depend upon 
the same interpretive principle: binary division. Further, each reading is vulnerable to 
“McGann’s razor”—that problematic complicity between Romantic ideology and 
criticism consisting of “an uncritical absorption in Romanticism’s own self-
representations” (McGann 1). The “evolutionary model” is complicit because it 
uncritically accepts Wordsworth’s own teleological schema of development (the “growth 
and progress of a poet’s mind”), the “devolutionary tale” because it relies heavily on 
Romantic tropes of inspiration, creativity, and imagination.  
In place of the above static frame, I propose that one may understand the apparent 
disparity between Wordsworth’s early and late poetry as a consequence of continuous 
processes or career-long practices of revision. My goal is to erase the dichotomy between 
the two Wordsworths by means of an interpretive model which can account for 
difference, change, and even diminishment. Still, one might object that my argument 
merely represents a different means of preserving the prototypical division between the 
early and late Wordsworth(s): I support the basic aesthetic judgment underlying the 
theory of decline, and doing so presumably risks reifying the same “doctrinal standard” 
or “chronological reflex” embodied therein. The question thus becomes: How can one 
retain the essential thesis of the Great Decade without falling victim to its tendency to 
polarize the poet?4 
                                                           
4 As Lionel Trilling warns, “mechanical and simple notions of the mind, and of the poetic process are all 





The solution lies in how one chooses to address Wordsworth’s revisions or, more 
accurately, the phenomenon of Wordsworthian revision. For what the aforementioned 
categories of criticism have in common, however diverse their purposes, is not simply a 
common frame of reference (the master-narratives of development or decline) but also a 
particular methodology with respect to textual changes. From both perspectives, revisions 
are objects or discrete phenomena—changes to be taken as either evidence of the status 
of the text or proof of the influence external events (historical, social, or psychological) 
have exercised upon Wordsworth’s poetry. Such approaches therefore fail to consider 
how revision qua revision can at once provide the substance for analysis and serve as the 
operative principle of that analysis. In other words, they fail to consider how dynamics of 
reading and writing (for revision subsumes both) are not necessarily the manifest effects 
of some external cause, but simultaneously causes, motives, or catalysts and effects 
generated by the recursive movements of poetic production. This shortcoming may 
therefore be remedied by carefully tracing those processes of reading and writing which, 
in aggregate, provide a sufficiently accurate portrait of the poet’s consciousness. 
Undoubtedly, any critical effort which  features “consciousness” as an analytical 
paradigm must proceed carefully: the term not only evokes what many consider an 
outmoded style of criticism but also threatens to lapse into the same hermeneutic 
circularity evinced by those former explanations of decline which interpreted Romantic 
poetry according to Romanticism’s own epistemic or tropological models. However, this 
potential theoretical pitfall may be avoided by adopting an appropriately rigorous method 





an appropriate context for such arguably “formalist” methodology. One must operate both 
within and without the text, reading on its terms while not becoming limited by them. 
This approach is necessary for two reasons. First of all, either theoretical 
extreme—a consummately formalist method on the one hand, a thoroughly new 
historicist perspective on the other—becomes reductive in its reluctance to engage one 
half of the available context. The former, upholding the aesthetic or “organic” unity of 
the work, is limited to internal and ultimately subjective pronouncements concerning the 
structure and content of the poem; the latter, in emphasizing cultural, historical, or 
biographical factors, fails to consider that the poem itself—specifically, the act of writing 
the poem—exercises an influence upon the poet. While either approach limits the 
efficacy of interpretation, I find the latter especially dangerous because it provides a more 
theoretically “current” (and thus tempting) critical approach even as it imposes another 
restriction upon reading. Wordsworth’s poetry characteristically turns inward upon itself, 
reflexively critiquing its own content and form. One should not exclude this aspect of the 
text because it is representative of a “Romantic ideology” but evaluate how it reveals the 
implicit tensions of the text and their role in that text’s formation. 
My reading of Wordsworth is indebted to Susan Wolfson’s Formal Charges: The 
Shaping of Poetry in British Romanticism. Therein, Wolfson employs a “contextualized 
formalist criticism” which, while retaining New Criticism’s “commitment to close 
reading and its care for poetic form,” seeks to avoid the insularity of that school by 
engaging how “formal actions and choices” themselves “were enmeshed in networks of 
social and historical conditions” (2, 4). I follow Wolfson in accepting that one may 





conditions,” my argument considers the context of poetic composition which arises when 
one collates and compares the variant texts of Wordsworth’s poems. In other words, the 
context of my own “formalism” becomes a network comprised of difference—a set of 
intertextual relationships which emerges when one analyzes how the poem has been 
altered, reshaped, and rewritten. This network is representative of both the poem’s and 
poet’s (discursive) history, and may provide a useful (if often evasive) image of the 
poet’s mind—a biography of a poetic consciousness in process.  
Yet even a method predicated on process must establish a paradigm or point of 
reference. Wordsworth did not revise for revision’s own sake; to suggest as such would 
be to forward a rather reductive, mechanically psychoanalytic view of revision as an 
involuted form of repetition compulsion. But if we instead consider what is at stake for 
Wordsworth in each revision—what, precisely, is being modified through the acts of 
rereading and rewriting—revision becomes not a groundless and self-indulgent exercise 
but a value-laden attempt to articulate or realize a particular poetic goal. In the essay 
“Wordsworth Revisited,” Geoffrey Hartman avers that in Wordsworth’s poetry, “a new 
attitude toward consciousness—a radical consciousness of consciousness—is brought to 
light: [he] is truly a subjective thinker” (9). This distinctive characteristic of 
Wordsworth’s verse—its radical inwardness—is also indicative of its overriding purpose, 
the poetic and discursive end which subsumes all others: the need for self-articulation—
or, in the words of Mary Jacobus, “the poet’s urgent need to constitute himself as poet” 
(128).  
The struggle to attain and articulate a stable poetic identity permeates 





always the manifest subject, but of narrative works which, due to their efforts to assume 
other voices (of pedlars, vagrants, or even children) might at first appear decidedly 
impersonal. The evidence of this struggle toward self-definition lies in the poetry’s 
manifest methodology: subjectivity is not only the subject but the site of composition; 
memory, experience, and feeling are “read” through a versified phenomenology which 
draws material from the mind only to turn the mind inward upon itself (its text) once 
more. This movement is amplified and rendered explicit in the lyrics, where the “I” is not 
only a ubiquitous lens but an active, reflective voice at once forming and interrogating its 
own identity. Moreover, Wordsworth’s ever-present “I” is specifically textual—an entity 
constructed within and by means of writing. As Andrew Bennett explains, “his topic is, 
above all, the way in which the poet, the man, is composed by, composed in, poetic 
composition, in writing” (6). Finally, we may deduce that the poetic identity represented 
in Wordsworth’s poems is necessarily an idealized self—not only because the very 
concept of a unitary, transcendental ego is open to question, but also because of the 
supererogatory demands made upon that ego. Wordsworth’s poetic self was expected not 
merely to speak but to constantly reaffirm the poet’s vocation, his qualifications and 
capacities, his right to speak—meaning, to write—himself into being. In this light, 
revision becomes not only a process of emending the text but an effort to amend, reshape, 
reconstitute, and rewrite the self.  
Wordsworth’s project of perpetual self-(re)definition is discernable, to some 
extent, in all of his poetry. Even those poems which were not substantially altered (and 
this includes only a handful) were a part of the process, for they would inevitably be 





relationships between poems shaped (at least for the poet) the meaning of any individual 
text. The result of any substantial textual revision was, then, a concomitant revision of 
“Wordsworth,” of Wordsworth-as-Poet, of “Wordsworth-as-oeuvre: the Author as the 
Mastertext to which every individual text . . . ultimately refers” (Siskin 109). 
The origin and the epicenter of this panoptic process is undoubtedly The Prelude. 
Tellingly subtitled “The Growth of the Poet’s Mind,”5 Wordsworth’s “great soliloquy” 
constitutes his most sustained engagement with a single text, both in terms of fresh 
composition and revision. It is at once a career-spanning and career-defining work, for it 
not only preoccupied Wordsworth for almost the whole of his poetic career (from roughly 
1798 to 1850) but literally was his career. Clifford Siskin’s comment that The Prelude is 
“quite simply, the most extraordinary resume in English history” is only partially correct: 
the poem is not only the secondary account or “curriculum vitae-like detailing” of “an 
individual’s training and qualifications for performing his life’s work,” but the locus of 
those processes of becoming—the poet’s poet-hood (identity) made manifest or, to adopt 
an appropriately rhetorical characterization, the Poet’s synecdochic self (115).  
 But what kind of poem—or what kind of self—is The Prelude? In his 
introduction to The Prelude: A Critical Casebook, Stephen Gill summarizes the 
complicated circumstances surrounding the poem’s composition and publication as 
follows: 
     The many-sided oddness of The Prelude still confronts all new readers who probe into   
     the poem at all and remains even now part of its essential being. And the oddness is?  
     At least the following facts about the identity of what is routinely—and rightly— 
     referred to as one of the greatest of Romantic poems: (1) that there is not one Prelude  
     but many; (2) that the poem known by this title evolved over many years during the  
                                                           
5 Of course, this subtitle was not given to the poem by Wordsworth but by his executors. However, there is 
substantial evidence (within correspondence) to suggest that the poet himself referred to The Prelude as 





     poet’s lifetime and has continued to evolve until practically the present day; and (3)  
     that the poem that student readers are most likely to encounter . . . was never  
     authorized by the poet, exists in no incontrovertibly established text, and was not even  
     known about until three-quarters of a century after the poet’s death and the appearance  
     of the poem he did authorize for publication. (Introduction 4) 
 
Though often rehearsed, these facts are still startling. When Jonathan Arac declares that 
“[w]e ourselves hardly have the concepts to disentangle so complex a knot of intention, 
text, and history,” he is by no means exaggerating (36-37). Even if one ignores the 
myriad editions of the poem, the reader confronting The Prelude can (currently) expect to 
find at least three vastly different texts: the Two-Part Prelude of 1798; the 13 book 
Prelude of 1805; and the fourteen book poem of 1850. Many critics also recognize two 
additional versions: a “Five-Book Prelude” dating from approximately 1804 and an 
1819-20 intermediate text of thirteen books.6 The complexity resulting from the sheer 
number of potential reading texts is only compounded when one considers precisely how 
different the respective versions are. As Zachary Leader explains,  
     From the time of the poem’s publication in 1850, three months after Wordsworth’s  
     death, from a manuscript “left ready for the Press by the Author,” to 1926, when de  
     Selincourt first made public, in a facing-text edition, the thirteen book version  
     Wordsworth completed in 1805, The Prelude was known in its authorized or 1850  
     version, the result of thirty-four years of painstaking but intermittent revision,  
     including three full-scale revisions (in 1816/19, 1832, and 1839) as well as numerous  
     smaller alterations. Ultimately, these revisions involved nearly half of the 1805  
     version’s 8000 or so lines. (667) 
 
While it is helpful (and mostly accurate) to conceive of the poem in terms of those 
dates and versions which presumably represented—temporarily at least—what the poet 
considered a “completed” text, Leader’s “numerous smaller alterations” is a decided 
understatement: most evidence indicates that Wordsworth returned to the poem quite 
frequently between these watershed revisions. Thus, the concept of a “finished” version 
                                                           





of The Prelude is by necessity a critical fiction. As Gill records when writing of the 1805 
Prelude, “There is no single, unimpeachable text of this version, as Wordsworth 
subjected it to revision even as the manuscripts were being made” (Introduction 17). 
The disagreement between Gill and Leader evident in the preceding quotations 
(concerning the existence of an “authorized” text) points to another dimension of the 
“problems” surrounding The Prelude: namely, that almost every aspect of its 
composition, publication, and subsequent editing has been (and still is) subject to heated 
critical debate. Indeed, “The Great Prelude Debate,” despite its considerable scope, 
addresses only a portion of the contested issues. As a result, The Prelude was not and will 
never be a “unified, discrete, finished, stable textual object” (Wolfson, “Revision” 101); 
it is a radically unstable text, a poem perpetually in flux.  
Yet this is not the only instability characteristic of The Prelude. In addition to the 
pronounced differences between “versions,” one encounters in any given reading text an 
internal dialectic of competing ideas, images, and discourses.7 In her “‘Answering 
Questions and Questioning Answers’: The Interrogative Project of The Prelude,” Susan 
Wolfson draws upon the philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer and the reader-response 
theories of Hans Robert Jauss to argue that The Prelude is “self-evidently a poem in the 
interrogative mode” which “despite its designs of resolution . . . habitually leaves its most 
critical questions unanswered, or answered with something less than full conviction and 
simplicity” (128). Further, she claims, the poem constantly critiques those propositions 
which it does permit to emerge: “Passages [will] rarely inscribe a conceptual pattern 
without destabilizing its authority—sometimes soon after, sometimes nearly 
                                                           
7 Because the 1799 “Two-Part Prelude,” is more internally consistent than the later, much longer versions 
of the poem, it represents a possible exception to this rule. Yet even in this early version—wherein the 





simultaneously” (131). Ultimately, this “dialogics of question and answer” creates a 
“destructive circularity” that precludes the possibility of any singular or stable 
(monologic) meaning (142, 152): the poem is inherently heteroglossic, sustaining “A 
tempest, a redundant energy, / vexing its own creation” (1805 I.46-7). In a much different 
context, William Galperin provides an apt description of the poem’s internal instability: 
The Prelude is “the autobiography that immediately deconstructed the very self it 
promoted” (166).  
Any proposition about the poetic self which emerges from or within The Prelude 
is thus subject to compounded torsion. Outside of the text, Wordsworth-writing impinges 
upon the stability of the poetic line, altering the poem and thus altering the character of 
the poet portrayed therein; within the text, Wordsworth’s (lyric) “I” (in its perpetual 
present) questions, contests, and often dismantles the “props of [its own] affections,” at 
once testing identities and making any singular, logically consistent self impossible. This 
doubly-comprised semantic indeterminacy is further augmented by the indeterminacy of 
the poem’s form—a generic frame which might otherwise provide some ground (via 
convention) for stable signification. Leon Waldoff explains this phenomenon as follows: 
     The form of The Prelude is perhaps the most mixed of all Wordsworth’s poems, being  
     at once autobiography, epic, elegy, verse epistle, romance, pastoral, and, of course,  
     lyric, that most protean and versatile of forms. His reliance on more than one form— 
     or, to be more accurate, more than one tradition of poetic forms—in each of the major  
     lyrics and The Prelude suggests that it takes more than one poetic tradition to  
     represent the subjectivity of the speaker in each work. Wordsworth adopts a form such  
     as the ode or elegy or the epic, but he appropriates from various poetic traditions  
     whenever is necessary, within certain generic and formal limits, to enable the “I” in its  
     act of self-representation in each work to achieve its expressivist, constitutive, and  





While Waldoff provides a viable rationale for the formal heterogeneity of The Prelude,8 
his explanation also grants Wordsworth’s “expressivist, constitutive, and self-
transformative aims” too much constancy. The poet’s aims, though multiple and not 
necessarily compatible with each other, are presumed to be more or less stable. As such, 
Waldoff assumes that the self or subjectivity Wordsworth wishes to represent maintains a 
more or less constant (potential or desired) identity over time. Granted, Waldoff is careful 
to circumscribe the source of that discursive self as follows: 
     In the case of the major lyrics and The Prelude, the person whose feelings  
     Wordsworth describes, identifies with, and conjures up the feelings of is less the  
     empirical Wordsworth that he wanted his readers to think of when he used the phrase  
     “the poet in his own person” than the imaginatively reconstituted self he prefers to  
     remember or tries to become. (155) 
 
But even the idea of an “imaginatively reconstituted self” (idealized “I” or Poet) implies a 
degree of conceptual integrity—in this case, a semi-platonic “I” who is ever being sought 
beyond the bounds of the cave. The desired self may be a “dramatized, transitional self,” 
but the hint of transcendental unity remains: the idealized “I” is granted partial immunity 
to the instabilities permeating the text, a “special mode of being” which protects the (idea 
of the) Poet from any obstinate questionings (29).  
That said, Waldoff’s observations on The Prelude’s heterogeneous form still have 
merit; his discussion simply needs to be reoriented. Consider the identity between two 
forms of self-definition in the poem: self-definition as the poem’s effort to articulate its 
own consummately idiosyncratic formal character; and self-definition as the realization 
of poetic identity, or the creation of “character” by means of form. In other words, there 
is no separation between the poem’s means and its ends; therein, poetic forms or 
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different forms/traditions for the purpose of self-representation, though I would suggest “appropriates” is a 





traditions are not mustered toward representational aims so much as a consciousness is 
created of and structured by form. There is no “first” or “prior” term in this equation: 
consciousness is form and form consciousness. The Poet is the poem—both created by 
and through one another.  
The quasi-Heideggerian circularity of these terms suggests a very pragmatic 
point: The Prelude, by virtue of its subject, form, and style, is as much creating the poet 
as it is being created by him. One could draw useful distinctions between the empirical 
Wordsworth (self-as-lived), Wordsworth-writing ((sense of) self-as-poet), and 
Wordsworth-as-Poet (the lyrical “I” or self-as-imagined); but regardless of how 
thoroughly one discriminates between “real” and “fictive” selves, the fact remains that 
both realms influence and shape one another. A poet’s self-image may well be a fictional 
construct, but it has very real ramifications. Wordsworth was shaped by The Prelude’s 
“Wordsworth” just as surely as a reader’s understanding of the poet is conditioned by the 
poem—and, as will be seen, by precisely the same means. 
At this point, we have tentatively established the following:  
1) The Prelude is not simply an individual poem by Wordsworth but, as a 
“mastertext” of poetic identity (the central preoccupation of the poet’s 
career), the functional center of the Wordsworthian corpus. 
2) The Prelude is a radically unstable text in material, semantic, and formal 
registers. 
3) The Prelude and Wordsworth’s poetic self—what Andrew Bennett calls, 





essentially one and the same. The poem which claims to track “The 
Growth of the Poet’s Mind” shapes the very growth it wishes to describe.  
Given these suppositions, one can establish a motive principle for subsequent analysis: 
The efforts toward self-definition and the articulation of poetic identity manifest in The 
Prelude are not exclusive to or confined within the boundaries of that poem but reach 
outward toward the whole of the Wordsworthian corpus. This is a direct consequence of 
a) The Prelude’s explicit subject (the poet’s mind), which leads to the creation of an idea 
of a poetic identity or self-image that structures and informs other poetic production; and 
b) its plural, palimpsestuous text(s), which both indirectly and directly interact with other 
poetic texts—interpenetrating, shaping, and often wholly subsuming subsidiary verse. An 
analysis which seeks to understand the shape of the poet’s career may therefore begin 
within or, more accurately, across the Prelude(s), and derive thereof a method for reading 
the figure of the Poet as it develops over time.  
When time (development, change, or potential discontinuity) becomes a 
consideration, Wordsworth’s revisionary practices—as well as the content of the 
revisions themselves (whether consisting of addition or deletion)—come to the fore. This 
is equally true of narrative time and real time: the lyric “I” questions and reorients itself 
as the poem proceeds through discursive time; Wordsworth the editor, the revisionist, and 
the reader questions and alters his text(s) over the course of his life. To a great extent, 
one can accurately define both these movements as types of revision: the first, as an 
internal revision of understanding; and the second, as an explicit and external revision of 
texts. However, the crucial realization is that the second process—whereby Wordsworth 





the (re-)writer of himself, Wordsworth can direct the course of that textual self’s 
becoming. With any act or instance of revision, Wordsworth-writing can impose or 
exercise a palpable design upon his poetic self.  
In his landmark study Wordsworth’s Poetry: 1787-1814, Geoffrey Hartman 
provides an apt characterization of The Prelude’s place in Wordsworth’s corpus and, by 
extension, a means for understanding the effects of Wordsworth’s revisionary practices:  
     And, by a curious irony, the unpublished Prelude, which is his greatest testimony to  
     the living mind, now discourages further self-exploration. . . . [L]ater sentiments . . .  
     do not rely, in their weakness, on the external authority of the church, but on the  
     internal authority of his own greatest poem, which is kept private, and as scripture to  
     himself abets the flat reiteration of his ideas in a slew of minor poems. (330) 
 
Putting aside—for now—the aesthetic judgment(s) intimated here, the crucial idea is 
rather that of The Prelude as Wordsworth’s “scripture to himself.”  
Hartman’s metaphor is ample. The comparison of The Prelude to scripture both 
draws upon and draws out an immense chain of associations between the poem and 
biblical language, motifs, paradigms, and structural devices.9 However, the most 
important consideration is not the direct correspondences between biblical and poetic 
texts but the semantic character of the vehicle itself: Scripture is law, commandment, and 
Word; it claims to speak with the voice of God and thus with absolute authority over all 
creation. If one transposes this essence and function to the text of The Prelude, the poem 
figures not simply as a center but as an all-encompassing wholeness—the ur-text of all 
poetic creation. Due to the paradoxical internalization of the Word and its unequivocal 
authority, and given that Wordsworth literally writes himself (the poet, a textual creation) 
into being, this scripture is strangely contingent upon the will of the subject(ivity) it seeks 
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to command. Granted, contingency haunts both forms of scripture: the ultimate 
“meaning” of the Word always depends on how and by whom it is interpreted. Yet, in the 
case of The Prelude, scripture can literally and physically be rewritten.  
Hartman’s metaphor provokes several important questions. For example, what 
problems emerge when he who wields the Word is subject to and determined by the 
boundaries and limitations of rhetoric? What effect do these boundaries and limitations 
have upon the thinking, writing subject? And what is the ultimate product of that process, 
in terms of its impact upon both poem and poet? 
If the poem is created by the poet, and the Poet created by the poem, we can only 
know one through the rhetoric of the other. Therefore the question of revision must be 
addressed by way of an understanding of poetic form—the frames of interpretation, 
understanding, and representation which constitute and structure The Prelude and, by 
extension, the whole of Wordsworth’s poetry. Despite McGann’s assertions, this does not 
necessarily constitute a problematic complicity between criticism and a “Romantic 
ideology.” Wolfson demonstrates as such with her forceful reply to McGann’s critique: 
“Some [Romantic] poems do turn from social conflict, or use their forms to exile and 
displace disruptive knowledge; but other poems, far from concealing the problematic of 
form, provoke it anew, as a condition of their very composition” (15). Form in many 
Romantic poems necessarily functions as a critique of its own premises, opening them up 
to question: “designs of unity in . . . [many] Romantic poems reflect on rather than 
conceal their constructedness” (14; emphasis added).  
 Undoubtedly, The Prelude is the most reflective and inward-turning of the 





and reflection in its text(s), and subsequently use the revealed problematic[s] of form as a 
means of approaching the much larger problem of Wordsworth’s poetic decline. In the 
following, three key passages will open The Prelude to the problems which will 
preoccupy the remainder of this study.  
We turn first to the “two consciousnesses” passage, found originally in the second 
part of the “Two-Part Prelude” and occupying an analogous position in the 1805 and 
1850 texts: 
     A tranquilizing spirit presses now 
     Upon my corporeal frame, so wide appears 
     The vacancy between me and those days, 
     Which yet have such self-presence in my heart 
     That sometimes when I think of them I seem 
     Two consciousnesses—conscious of myself,  
     And of some other being. (1799 2.25-31) 
 
This passage remains intact and relatively unchanged in all versions of The Prelude—a 
fact which, considering the radical instability of the poem, is highly significant. Through 
frequent (re)reading(s), critics have also made it something of a touchstone for analysis, 
adopting the rather useful figure of a radically divided self to illustrate various textual 
tensions and conflicts. Most commonly, though, it is taken to be a figure which addresses 
the ineluctable remove between a past and a present self and thus an illustration of a 
problematic mechanism central to most Wordsworth poems: memory. This interpretation 
finds abundant support in the passage, wherein Wordsworth’s lines move between a 
present, active, self-conscious “I” and a static, stable Other; or, in Wolfson’s words, “a 
speaking subject (‘me’) and textual object (‘those days’ of ‘some other being’)” 
(“Answering” 146). It is important to note that the two strongest verbs in the passage—





subject, both of which (though by no means equivalent) are essentially figures for the 
active mind. In the Norton edition of The Prelude, the editors further emphasize the role 
of mind, pointing out that the “corporeal frame” of these lines represents a “recollection 
of Tintern Abbey 44-46” wherein “the corporeality of the body is stressed to show the 
dominance of mind” (15, n.4). The speaking subject’s status as a conscious, reflexive self 
only serves to emphasize the width of the “vacancy” between present and past selves: 
“those days” have a “self-presence”—i.e., a nearly independent, tangible existence—in 
the speaker’s mind; he is studying them as he would unfamiliar phenomena because their 
distance in time makes them strange. 
Yet the speaker’s “estrangement by vacancy” from his other, former self is not 
only a cognitive dilemma (Wolfson, “Answering” 146); it is a predicament of reading and 
writing. After all, the speaker is not simply thinking about “those days” but writing about 
them, and his study of those self-presences is fundamentally an act of reading the 
remembered past. For this reason, the aforementioned division of mind and body is 
analogous to the division between the self-writing and the corporealized text of the past, a 
text which has become Other—separate, distinct, and temporally immobile. From here, it 
is no great leap to move, as many critics have, to a consideration of the passage as 
expressive of a formal dilemma which haunts and permeates the whole of The Prelude: 
the problem of autobiography.  
Wordsworth’s effort to read his past evokes an ineluctable “gap” or inadequacy 
inherent to all autobiography—an epistemic predicament Anne Mellor describes as “the 
uncertain relation between the self-as-lived and the self-as-imagined, between the 





Given this vacancy, she argues, the closure or unity of the self (and thus the text, which is 
presumed to be equivalent) becomes a virtual impossibility; the gap can only be bridged 
by the fiction of a “transcendental ego” or “unitary self that is maintained over time by 
the activity of memory” (293).  
But this fiction is a tenuous remedy at best, and the passage’s insistence on binary 
division—on the presence of two consciousnesses—belies the poet’s insistence (note the 
emphatic “such self-presence”) that he can span the vacancy between selves by means of 
(re)reading the past. Wordsworth attempts to encompass present and past by means of the 
unitary “I,” but ultimately the “other being” gets the literal last word. In essence, the 
problem is that the past is not the corporealized, stable, legible text he wishes it to be; the 
vacancy is too wide, and his vision inadequate to the task. The poet is sufficiently 
reflexive or self-critical to openly acknowledge the autobiographical predicament but 
tries to subvert it nevertheless. Yet his effort ultimately fails, for the two consciousnesses 
remain, and remain separate and discrete. As Wolfson indicates, it is important that the 
only alteration to the passage in later versions of The Prelude is to change “heart” to 
“mind,” “as if to concede the cognitive dilemma against the emotional faith in one’s life 
as a coherent and legible text” (“Answering” 147). 
By recognizing the problem of “two consciousnesses”—the fundamental problem 
of autobiography—The Prelude attempts to negotiate and circumvent (if not eliminate) 
the epistemic “vacancy” between present and past. The order of the latter terms is 
important: memory must always function in retrospect, moving from the I’s now to the 
Other’s then via the power of recollection; it cannot, strictly speaking, construct the past 





problematic mechanism, Wordsworth’s poem once again reflects upon a “cognitive 
dilemma” which informs its construction, attempting to subvert (or sublimate) the 
problem by subsumption: 
     Of these and other kindred notices 
     I cannot say what portion is in truth 
     The naked recollection of that time, 
     And what may rather have been called to life  
     By after-meditation. . . . (1805 3.644-48) 
 
Here, Wordsworth essentially concedes that memory is a creative process: a “portion” of 
the experience, event, or object might have been “called to life / By after-meditation”—
literally given life (“called”) by the poet’s Word. It is worth mentioning that this 
formulation appears to conform to one of Wordsworth’s most famous poetic maxims: that 
“Poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings: it takes its origin from emotion 
recollected in tranquility” (Prose 1:148.387-88). On the surface, then, Wordsworth 
appears to acknowledge and accept that the act of recall is inherently a creative—and thus 
technically “inaccurate”—process. Nevertheless, there is an implicit tension in these 
lines. The words in the phrase “naked recollection,” rather than cooperatively signifying 
“the truth and only the truth,” actually grate against one another: for against the starkness 
of “naked,” to “recollect” implies at once a fragmentary and piecemeal procedure and a 
process that is repeated or secondary. And as the act of recall is an act of reading a past 
self, the poem once again confronts a dilemma endemic to autobiographical discourse. 
The poet’s meta-awareness of the quandaries inherent to the autobiographical 
form does not apply exclusively to reading: autobiography is not simply recollection but 
representation; it is reading and writing. In this way, the preceding passage reveals what 





110). Quoting Jonathan Culler, she phrases the question thus: “to what degree are the 
events ‘determined by various narrative and discursive requirements?’” (qtd. in Formal 
110). Paul de Man provides an unusually straightforward answer: Completely.  
     We assume that life produces autobiography as an act produces its consequences, but       
     can we not suggest, with equal justice, that the autobiographical project may itself  
     produce and determine the life and that whatever the writer does is in fact governed by  
     the technical demands of self-portraiture and thus determined, in all its aspects, by the  
     resources of his medium? (“Autobiography” 69) 
 
Although de Man phrases his answer (judiciously) as a question, the disproportionate 
weight of the sentence’s second half suggests what further consideration of de Man’s 
premises will confirm: that he conceives of autobiography as a form inextricably bound 
up in its own constructedness.  
But for de Man, to refer to autobiography as a “form” at all is an equivocation. 
Later in his essay, we find the following (re)definition of the term: 
     Autobiography, then, is not a genre or a mode, but a figure of reading or of  
     understanding that occurs, to some degree, in all texts. The autobiographical moment  
     happens as an alignment between the two subjects involved in the process of reading  
     in which they determine each other by mutual reflexive substitution. (70) 
 
Given the predominance of reading and the equivocal identity of “the reader” (who can 
be at once the poet or the poet’s audience), de Man’s mention of “two subjects” has the 
potential to mislead. Here, Jon Cook’s explication of “Autobiography as De-Facement” is 
helpful:  
     The argument is that the sense of an identity, a subject, or a life produced by  
     autobiography is a rhetorical effect. The rhetorical figure which creates autobiography  
     is in the ‘alignment between the two subjects’, the one who writes, and the one who is  
     written about, each determining the other in an endless and unresolvable play of  
     difference and identity. . . . The rhetorical structure of autobiography divides the self  






Thus explicated, de Man’s formulation is clearly evocative of the “two consciousnesses” 
passage: the moment of reading—i.e., the moment of Wordsworth’s reading his past 
(which is the “auto-biographical moment”)—results in the division of the poet into “I” 
and “some other being.” According to de Man, Wordsworth’s attempts to bridge the 
vacancy between these consciousnesses cannot possibly succeed: it is within language 
and therefore subject to the limitations of rhetoric, wherein “the non-coincidence of sign 
and meaning” precludes any possibility of an alignment between signifier and signified 
(Cook 37). In other words, both of Wordsworth’s consciousnesses cease to refer to any 
empirical reality or self at the moment when they are written into the text: language is 
rhetoric and rhetoric does not mean, it figures, replacing any real referent with an 
arbitrary and intrinsically meaningless sign. As a result, the relationship between 
Wordsworth’s two consciousnesses can never be resolved. Because neither figure has a 
discrete referent, they determine or depend upon one another, signifying only by means 
of “an endless and unresolvable play of difference and identity.”10 
De Man’s autobiographical moment “happens as an alignment of two subjects 
involved in the process of reading in which they determine each other by mutual reflexive 
substitution” (70). This moment, comparable to the alignment (and separation of) “two 
consciousnesses,” creates a concomitant meta-textual moment: “The specular moment 
                                                           
10  In my estimation, the inherent negativity of de Man’s theory of language renders it untenable. 
Regardless of how rigorously one argues for the complete divorce of sign from referent, the fact remains 
that there was an actual, material man named Wordsworth who composed The Prelude. Thus, I am not 
arguing from the perspective of deconstruction or of Paul de Man: I take issue with the indispensable axiom 
of his theory—namely, that language cannot possibly signify, mean, or refer to anything.  
That said, de Man’s theory of autobiography and the deconstructive modes of reading evinced 
therein are particularly effective and useful analytic tools in the context of my argument. This is true for 
two reasons: First, by focusing my analysis on Wordsworth-as-poet, and by attempting to track the 
consequences of revision within that textual system, I am adopting a rather Derridean maxim: nothing is 
outside of the text—especially not the “poet.” And second, because de Man’s theory of autobiography is 
predicated on the endless play of figuration, reading, and writing—an approach which emphasizes those 






that is part of all understanding reveals the tropological structure that underlies all 
cognitions, including knowledge of the self” (71). As Cook explains, 
     Doubleness and division creates what de Man describes as ‘a specular structure’  
     (1984: 70): autobiography is the equivalent of a mirror, but a mirror in which it  
     becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish between reflection and reality. The writer  
     looks back or looks at him- or herself in pursuit of finding or knowing a self. But this  
     self is composed in writing. According to de Man, autobiographical writing turns  
     around this moment. It is tropological, in a way that recalls the root meaning of ‘trope’   
     in the Greek word for ‘turn’. To read autobiography is to be caught up in this turning  
     of the self and of language. (51) 
 
The “specular structure”—a structure of seeing or, more appropriately, reading—enables 
self-awareness and reflection; but the insight gained is not “self-knowledge.” Instead, it is 
an awareness of the “tropological structure” or constructedness of autobiography, and 
thus an awareness of the contingency (i.e., written-ness) of the text. The fact that the self 
observed is a self that has been “composed” proves an ineluctable impediment to 
unclouded sight and coherent reading: one subject cannot “read” the other because 
language does not signify, but tropes, thereby turning away from meaning and 
substituting a figure.  
Curiously enough (or perhaps purposefully), de Man does not address the passage 
of The Prelude which most clearly evinces a specular structure. That passage, another 
oft-analyzed sequence, reads as follows: 
     As one who hangs down-bending from the side 
     Of a slow-moving boat upon the breast 
     Of a still water, solacing himself 
     With such discoveries as his eye can make 
     Beneath him in the bottom of the deeps, 
     Sees many beauteous sights—weeds, fishes, flowers, 
     Grots, pebbles, roots of trees—and fancies more, 
     Yet often is perplexed, and cannot part 
     The shadow from the substance, rocks and sky, 
     Mountains and clouds, from that which is indeed 





     In their true dwelling; now is crossed by gleam 
     Of his own image, by a sunbeam now, 
     And motions that are sent he knows not whence, 
     Impediments that make his task more sweet; 
     Such pleasant office have we long pursued 
     Incumbent o’er the surface of past time— 
     With like success. (1805 4: 247-64) 
 
To borrow from Wolfson, “[t]his is the epic simile . . . launched to image the perplexed 
epistemology of writing and reading autobiography” (Formal 128). The essential 
dynamics of the image are fairly uncomplicated: a man in a boat leans lazily over the side 
to gaze into the water. However, the optical dynamic of the passage (its “specular 
structure”) is complex and layered: the poet (object of the simile) first sees the bottom of 
the “still water,” which is populated with “weeds, fishes, flowers, / Grots, pebbles, roots 
of trees”; then he is “perplexed” by the surface of the water, which is reflecting “rocks 
and sky, / Mountains and clouds” and thus impeding his vision of the bottom; next, he 
sees in the water’s surface his own image, which crosses the former reflections; and 
finally, he is similarly “crossed” by a sunbeam and “motions that are sent he knows not 
whence.” If we begin by reading the simile literally, the passage may be said to move 
from “deeps” to surface to sky, pulling the observed object(s) or phenomena closer to the 
eye until they or their causes pass beyond visibility. However, it is even more crucial to 
note that each successive “level” of seeing impedes or obscures the former: “looking 
through” and seeing clearly is not an option after the eye is “perplexed” and then 
“crossed” because the layers interpenetrate, mix, and confound one another.  
As Cook rightly observes, the analogical mechanism of the simile is to “transform 
temporal into spatial relations” (33): the poet is “Incumbent o’er the surface of past 





unobservable (future) in an anti-regressive movement. Yet as vision is impeded by each 
successive level of time, the poet must attempt to “look through” and does so with 
decreasing efficacy. What we have, then, is a double movement: a movement up from the 
bottom which proceeds by means of the simile’s narrative, and an attempted movement 
down into the depths, which follows the poet’s field or range of vision. As he attempts to 
penetrate beneath the surface of past time, time moves up toward and beyond the present, 
progressively clouding and finally thwarting his vision altogether. Importantly, the two 
movements first “cross” when the poet sees a “gleam / Of his own image.” At this point, 
the depths become completely illegible.  
The analogical identities of levels and objects are easily identified: for example, 
the “weeds, fishes, flowers, / Grots, pebbles, roots of trees” in the depths are distant, 
discrete, natural objects which evoke Wordsworth’s ubiquitous vision of childhood and 
of the poet as a child, when he was yet Nature’s “favored being.” But the most resonant 
dynamic or moment of the passage arrives with that moment of self-recognition or (self)-
reflection—the moment wherein the poet can see nothing but the image of himself 
looking back at him.  
Clearly, this is a moment of (visual) recognition equivalent to what de Man called 
“the alignment of two subjects”: one movement—time—has brought the poet’s present 
self to the surface, where the poet-seeing observes not himself but the image, figure, or 
reflection of himself—a simulacrum. If these terms are transposed to the arena of texts 
and of reading and writing (which they never really left), the simulacrum of the poet 





“I,” which ultimately obscures the poet’s vision, preventing him from seeing his own past 
clearly.  
The passage thus constitutes a poeticized model of the processes of reading that 
both define and limit autobiographical discourse. The reflection, representative of 
Wordsworth’s present self, obscures the successive layers and depths of “past time,” 
which constitute an aggregate of former selves stretching back into childhood. As such, 
the poet’s present self filters, shapes, constructs, and determines how he reads former 
selves. The poet’s newly realized identity never really attains a stable state because it is 
quickly crossed and superseded by the upward thrust of time. Furthermore, that 
ephemeral “I” is necessarily a distorted or remade self—one comprised of the past but 
filtered through the demands and expedients of the narrative moment.  
The “figure of reading” evident in this passage is also directly applicable to 
Wordsworth’s processes of revision (de Man 70). Every time the poet revisited and 
reread his text(s), he effectively added another layer of interpretation, another (re)figuring 
of poetic identity to the existing aggregate of selves/texts. Wordsworth’s revisions to The 
Prelude thus accumulate like sediment—at once adding new material to the whole and 
changing the shape of the previous text, now further within the deeps. This is not an 
inherently negative process: the change between the 1799 and 1805 Preludes, for 
example, creates an entirely new, much different poem. Nor is it uniform: portions of The 
Prelude are relatively stable throughout all versions. It is, however, a process which 
yields perpetual change in the name of realizing a present poetic self (“I”) which is ever-
receding into the past. By the time The Prelude is in its “final,” 1850 incarnation, the 





frequent outcrops of several earlier formations, forming an almost geologic cross-section 
of earlier authorial selves” (Wood 8).  
Ultimately, autobiographical self-representation and revision are equivalent. 
Indeed, Wordsworth’s efforts to write autobiography, to reflect upon and “revise his self-
understanding” are inherently bound to more explicit revisionary processes (Hartman, 
“Introduction” xxv). Because Wordsworth’s poetic identity is realized through the text, 
he cannot update or amend the former without altering the latter. What’s more, the poet 
in the process of writing autobiography must remember, interpret, and incorporate a 
history which is comprised of texts and readings of texts. Wolfson explains this 
phenomenon as follows: 
     As poetic activity recollects, reviews, interprets, and reinterprets its phantoms of  
     conceit, poetic composition produces revision as the enactment as well as the report of  
     these processes. Scanning the surfaces and depths of time past, the “considerate and  
     laborious work” of writing returns Wordsworth to manuscripts past, to reperuse the  
     surfaces and gaps of their texts. Manuscripts as well as memories constitute his past,  
     and textual revision reduplicates, perpetuates, and enters into recollection. In this  
     involute, revision is not just compositional; it is the very trope of autobiography. . . .  
     (Formal 104) 
 
If revision is the rhetorical mechanism of autobiography, then it follows that the 
problematics of form inherent in autobiographical writing are applicable to processes of 
revision. The preceding conclusions may therefore be applied directly to the text of 
Wordsworth’s Prelude(s) as rubrics or frames for further analysis. By addressing how 
time, constructedness, memory, and the limitations of rhetoric inform the relationship 
between versions of The Prelude, one can determine the ultimate impact and import of 
Wordsworth’s revisionary practices.  
Yet even these conclusions are insufficient to support the contention that 





decline. However deeply the problematics of (autobiographical) form inform the shaping 
of poetic texts, they still do not implicitly explain how revision can compromise the 
quality of poetic production. In order to substantiate the link between revision and 
decline, one needs a means of demonstrating how revisionary practices can compromise 
or attenuate a poetic text.  
Nigel Wood’s discussion of retrospection and reordering in The Prelude provides 
a solid base for precisely such an effort. The relevant passages read as follows: 
     Retrospection reorders the events that contribute to the present ‘self’. . . The Prelude  
     represents, therefore, a proposition about the past that emerges from this anxiety to  
     construct it in the present. . . .‘Anxiety’ is an apt word for this reordering, as it  
     involves a working through of the displaced fears and repressed desires, a full coming  
     to terms (in a quite literal sense) with these shadows of authority or Otherness that  
     cannot be faced directly, either because they only now exist in a language that is  
     metaphorical (and so require extensive interpretation) or because they need to be  
     reassembled out of their chronological order in order that they can emerge for the  
     conscious mind. (21) 
 
One of the fundamental problems at work in autobiography is the inevitable 
constructedness of the life written therein—a life which is effectively “reordered” to suit 
the discursive or formal demands of narrative. When further figured as an act of reading, 
and as a revisionary act of reading which must, by necessity, be contingent upon the 
poet’s present, the effort to compose or write oneself becomes identical to what Wood 
calls the “proposition about the past which emerges from this anxiety to construct it in the 
present.” The following chapter will explain how the concept of “anxiety,” adapted to 
autobiographical discourse, aptly characterizes the process that shapes and impels 







Chapter 3: Anxiety and Autobiography 
While anxiety is indeed an “apt word” for the agonistic process(es) or energies 
which conditioned the Prelude’s (re-)composition, it is also an incredibly ambiguous one. 
Even Nigel Wood’s formulation, which stolidly (and accurately) characterizes 
Wordsworth’s anxiety as a process of “reordering,” threatens to become nebulous due to 
the profuse connotations the word has accrued in post-Freudian discourse (Introduction 
21). On the other hand, reductive definitions and an over-rigorous circumscription of 
meaning would inevitably collapse at the hands of the dynamic “working through” which 
at once constitutes and results from (an) anxiety. Ultimately, what one needs is an 
inclusive and flexible concept which may be located without becoming fixed; it is not 
necessary to know what anxiety “is” so long as one knows where and when it occurs. 
 According to Wood, Wordsworth’s anxiety was a discursive phenomenon which 
concomitantly subsumed and motivated a complex of psychological, temporal, and 
hermeneutic processes. However, Wood gives insufficient emphasis to what truly binds 
these processes—namely, their coincidence in what de Man calls the autobiographical or 
specular moment. As adduced in the previous chapter, this autobiographical moment 
“happens as an alignment between the two subjects involved in the process of reading in 
which they determine one another by mutual reflexive substitution” (de Man 
“Autobiography” 70). Further, the alignment between the one who writes and the one 
who is written about is specular because it represents a moment of vision or insight that 
“reveals the tropological structure which underlies all cognitions, including knowledge of 
the self” (72). Autobiographical discourse always bifurcates the writing subject, creating 





dividing the self, writing also makes possible a moment of reading wherein the self-who-
writes recognizes that the self-written-about is a rhetorical effect. The net result of this 
process is to make the poet see himself in the act of composing a self; he becomes aware 
of “his” constructedness. This “tropology of the subject” is poetic self-awareness or self-
consciousness.  
 Anxiety happens in and at this moment of poetic self-consciousness. It is a 
turning-inward which enables awareness yet frustrates closure. This is not the more 
familiar, more tangible type of anxiety (which is a felt anxiety, or anxiety as a 
psychological and physiological state), though such considerations are certainly 
relevant.11 Instead, this anxiety is explicitly linked to reading and writing autobiography: 
its character is distinctly discursive, for it arises from, is motivated by, and results in 
poetic production.  
 For de Man, all writing is inherently autobiographical. His treatment of 
Wordsworth and the Prelude is thus a means of adumbrating a “figure of reading” he 
thinks endemic to all literary texts. Of course, the first theorist to address the problem of 
autobiography in the “great soliloquy” was, in fact, Wordsworth himself: his treatments 
of the vacancy between “two consciousnesses,” the problem of “after-meditation,” and 
the “perplexed epistemology of autobiography” are all, appropriately enough, preludes to 
the readings of subsequent critics and theorists, de Man included (or even de Man 
especially). Though he may never have admitted the fact, Wordsworth also thought all 
writing autobiographical: the centrality and ubiquity of the Prelude in his career and 
corpus are testaments to that fact.  
                                                           






Yet ultimately, there is a crucial difference between Wordsworth-the-critic and 
Wordsworth’s critics—a difference borne not only of time and “distance” from texts but 
from the poet’s adamantine resolve to overcome the vacancies, gaps, and lacunae which 
permeated his texts. Whereas we, as readers, can safely accept textual instability and 
indeterminacy, Wordsworth could not: to do so would have meant compromising the 
poetic identity he was constructing within those texts. For this reason, the textual 
predicament critics describe as “autobiographical discourse” was, for Wordsworth, the 
source and site of profound anxiety. Possessed of (and perhaps by) “the poet’s urgent 
need to constitute himself as poet,” he developed a mode of poetic discourse which, 
because it took the poet’s subjectivity as its subject, was perpetually subject to the 
ineluctable flux of a being-in-time (Jacobus 128). The mutability of the poet’s mind and 
the evanescence of the temporal present thus yielded a poetry which was truly “never 
secure from the pressure of ‘second thoughts’” (Wolfson, Formal 109).  
 By means of this curious involute, Wordsworth’s poetry continually reinscribes 
the very inadequacies and impasses it wishes to repair: writing is the agent of its own 
frustration, because “acts of writing – acts that do not just record memory but themselves 
perform, act out, enact commemoration – both produce a poetic self and, at the same 
time, disturb any possibility of a coherent articulation of such a self” (Bennett 12, 
emphasis added). Yet the impossibility of coherence or wholeness—and further, an 
awareness of that impossibility—does not appear to dissuade the poet from pursuing 
completion. Writing and rewriting, he struggles against both the self represented within 
the poem and that self who has written or is writing the poem. This collision of ends and 





is never complete yet refuses to concede its contingency, a poetry which is inexorably 
and perpetually in crisis.  
 Of course, critics have long recognized the connection between Wordsworth’s 
verse and a sense of crisis. Indeed, the term has been such a staple of commentary that it 
has become the defining element of two entire genres of poetry implicitly associated with 
Wordsworth: the crisis lyric and crisis autobiography. The most famous examples of 
poems in the former mode include such indispensable works as “Lines written a few 
miles above Tintern Abbey,” “Resolution and Independence,” and “Ode: Intimations of 
Immortality”—all of which begin with or propose a creative dilemma and then proceed to 
offer, if not a solution, some means of compensatory solace. The term crisis 
autobiography, however, is consistently reserved for The Prelude itself, as Anne Mellor 
explains: 
     However fragile and tenuous the self linguistically constructed in The Prelude, the  
     poem’s overt rhetorical argument and structure locate it, as Meyer Abrams argued,  
     within the genre of “crisis autobiography,” a secularization of seventeenth- and  
     eighteenth-century religious autobiographies grounded in a narrative of confession and  
     conversion, of retrospection and introspection, based on the literary model of St.   
     Augustine’s Confessions. (294) 
 
In contrast to de Man’s “autobiography,” which “is not a genre or mode, but a figure of 
reading,” crisis autobiography has a much more specific (and therefore much more 
problematic) formal character. Indeed, given The Prelude’s heterogeneous, assimilative 
form, one might reasonably reject such a classification as altogether inadequate. But 
though there are problems inherent to applying such a label, one can preserve the fusion 
of crisis and autobiography in order to illustrate how “anxiety,” which is an oblique and 
slightly askew synonym for “crisis” anyway, is at once manifest in and constituent of 





 In its initial two-book incarnation (1799), The Prelude could be aptly described as 
a crisis lyric rather than a crisis autobiography. This is not only a consequence of its 
“smaller scope and much more concentrated power” but of the manner in which it begins 
(J. Wordsworth 568) —namely, with an especially plaintive and urgent question: 
                                              Was it for this 
     That one, the fairest of all rivers, loved 
     To blend his murmurs with my nurse’s song, 
     And from his alder shades and rocky falls, 
     And from his fords and shallows, sent a voice 
     That flowed along my dreams? (1799 1.1-6) 
   
Wordsworth provides no context and offers no explanation: “this” is simply “the 
crisis”—unnamed, unspecified, and therefore all the more threatening; and the question 
which it elicits recurs, accrues more weight, and finally crests at the poem’s twenty-sixth 
line, where the poet at last rounds off his periodic question and assumes a declarative 
(though still tentative) voice. Although he never supplies a specific antecedent for “this,” 
the subsequent content of Part I makes the nature of the crisis it references abundantly 
clear: Wordsworth has in some sense “failed” to be the poet he aspires to be. He has 
balked in the face of his great task—which, of course, is his nonexistent (but also 
ubiquitous) opus, The Recluse, a “philosophical poem, containing views of Man, Nature, 
and Society” (Wordsworth, Prose 3:5). The Prelude, as both a literary product and as a 
narrative, thus begins at and begins with a manifest creative anxiety, or anxiety about 
writing: Wordsworth is, as Jonathan Wordsworth avers, “writing this poem to find out 
why he cannot write the one he should” (572). As is always the case in his poems, 
Wordsworth’s means of negotiating a present crisis is to return to the past: therein, he 





reaffirm his vocation, and restore his confidence in those capacities which have been 
rendered suspect.  
 Yet “this” cannot be solved or effaced by any unswerving path from crisis to 
resolution or loss to restoration, for in the midst of that retrospective compensatory 
movement, Wordsworth must confront the limitations of autobiography—the problem of 
“two consciousnesses” which will be acknowledged for the first time in the 1799 
Prelude’s second part. Thus, despite the 1799 poet’s concluding declaration that he has 
retained—or more accurately, recovered—a “more than Roman confidence, a faith / That 
fails not” (II.489-90), the problem initiated by the poem’s opening question does not end 
with or within the 1799 Prelude. In order to restore his faith in himself, Wordsworth has 
created “Wordsworth”: he has effectively written himself into existence—not only as the 
“favored being” or “naked savage in a thunder shower” of the poet’s childhood, but also 
as a distinct voice, a lyrical “I” who questions, interprets, and re-orders past experience 
(1799 I.70, 26). And as this “I” is a “Wordsworth” grounded in the narrative present of 
the current crisis—a Wordsworth who reads from a distinct perspective and within a 
particular moment—it represents a self which will inevitably become the prior term in the 
alignment between two consciousnesses. Ultimately, the text’s opening “this” is both 
semantically and temporally ambiguous: the antecedent which constitutes the crisis-at-
hand must therefore shift with the passage of time.  
The entirety of the Prelude—that is, all of the Preludes, the grand text which all 
of the poem’s individual texts become—might therefore be described as a type of 
compositional reaction-formation: With each fresh reading, and with each subsequent 





work, which presupposes a fully-formed Poet, can proceed. But because The Prelude 
represents “a proposition about the past that emerges from this anxiety to construct it in 
the present,” it can no sooner dispel anxiety than it creates it anew (Wood 21). 
Furthermore, because The Prelude allows for no distinction between artist and artifact, 
because it constructs the poet and thereby asserts that the Poet actually is the poem, there 
can be no correspondent separation between the poetic (thinking, writing) subject and the 
poem’s “subject.” Therefore, the poem is not simply about a crisis, it is the crisis; it does 
not only represent or address an anxiety, it is that anxiety.  
However pithily described, autobiographical anxiety (as I conceive of it) is not a 
phenomenon which can be adequately conveyed in petrified grammatical constructions. It 
is dynamic by nature, and consists not of discrete texts but of relationships between texts, 
wherein Wordsworth’s (re)readings of himself are realized. Let us consider what happens 
to The Prelude’s opening sequence, the “glad preamble,” in the transition from the 1799 
crisis lyric to 1805 crisis autobiography:  
                                    Then, last wish— 
     My last and favorite aspiration—then 
     I yearn towards some philosophic song 
     Of truth . . .  
     But from this awful burthen I full soon 
     Take refuge, and beguile myself with trust 
     That mellower years will bring a riper mind 
     And clearer insight. Thus from day to day 
     I live a mockery of the brotherhood 
     Of vice and virtue, with no skill to part 
     Vague longing bred by want of power 
     From paramount impulse not to be withstood; 
     A timorous capacity, from prudence; 
     From circumspection, infinite delay.  
     Humility and modest awe themselves 
     Betray me, serving often for a cloak 
      To a more subtle selfishness, that now 





      Now dupes me with an overanxious eye . . . 
      Far better to have never heard the name 
      Of zeal and just ambition than to live 
      Thus baffled by a mind that every hour 
     Turns recreant to her task, takes heart again, 
     Then feels immediately some hollow thought 
     Hang like an interdict upon her hopes. 
     This is my lot; for either still I find 
     Some imperfection in the chosen theme,  
     Or see of absolute accomplishment 
     Much wanting—so much wanting—in myself 
     That I recoil and droop, and seek repose 
     In indolence from vain perplexity, 
     Unprofitably travelling towards the grave, 
     Like a false steward who hath much received 
     And renders nothing back. (1805 I. 229-276) 
 
In this particular case, Wordsworth’s revisions consist almost wholly of addition. 
Whereas the 1799 Prelude had opened with the “Was it for this” sequence, the 1805 
version waits 271 lines to pose that most crucial question. In context, this seems a 
perfectly reasonable and relatively unremarkable occurrence: Wordsworth is moving 
from a poem of two parts and 1,000 lines to an epic poem of 13 books and over 8,000 
lines; as the formal demands of a longer work are vastly different than those of a 
relatively self-contained (albeit expansive) lyric, the decision to reframe the opening 
simply makes sense.12 However, such a substantial textual change can still teach us about 
the processes of reading which have informed the poem’s re-conception. The “glad 
preamble” can therefore serve as a preliminary case study of Wordsworth’s processes of 
revision. To begin with a deceptively simple question: in comparison to the opening of 
the two-part Prelude, what does the “glad preamble” actually do? 
                                                           
12 One would be hard pressed to deny such an argument outright. Even Jonathan Wordsworth, a fierce 
proponent of the aesthetic superiority of the 1799 Prelude, feels compelled to concede that the two-part 





 First of all, the preamble supplies an ample antecedent for the first line’s 
previously undefined “this,” exhaustively describing the circumstances surrounding 
Wordsworth’s creative consternation. With verbs such as “yearn,” “beguile,” “betray,” 
“lock up,” “dupes,” “baffled by,” “turns recreant,” “recoil and droop,” and descriptors 
like “awful burthen,” “mockery,” “infinite delay,” “blank reserve,” “interdict,” 
“imperfection,” “indolence,” and “vain perplexity,” the passage could hardly be more 
emphatically bleak in its portrayal of creative blockage. The descent toward the last line’s 
“nothing” is thus meant to place as much rhetorical weight as possible on the ensuing 
question’s formerly undefined pronoun. Eventually, this strategy provokes (or is meant to 
provoke) an equally forceful recovery: by the close of the first book the poet feels not 
only that his “mind hath been revived” but also that he has now fixed firmly on a “theme 
/ Single and of determined bounds,” thereby achieving a type of certainty which is the 
direct antidote to any lingering “vain perplexity” (1805 1.665, 668-69).  
 Yet even as it works so strenuously to establish the poem’s archetypal pattern of 
fall and redemption, or crisis and recovery, or “imagination impaired” and “imagination 
restored,” the preamble (explicitly modeled on the traditional epic’s invocation) invokes a 
process that will ultimately threaten the stability of The Prelude’s structural schema: that 
of “self-constituting self-address” or (less eloquently) “self-conscious poetic self-
consciousness.” While critics have adopted a variety of frames for understanding this 
discursive phenomenon, Mary Jacobus’s explanation is perhaps most helpful. “The 
voice,” she writes, “is always a doubling of self, and more often a multiplication or 
alienation” (132). For this reason, the doubly self-conscious turn (note: troping) of 





creates or reveals certain gaps or “vacancies” inherent in its narrative scheme. Describing 
this turn as a “turning-away” or, in formal terms, apostrophe, Jacobus elaborates upon its 
consequences as follows: 
     Regarded as a digressive form, a sort of interruption, excess, or redundance,  
     apostrophe in The Prelude becomes the signal instance of the rupture of the temporal  
     scheme of memory by the time of writing.  Wordsworth’s ‘two consciousnesses’  
     (Prel. II, 32) can then be seen as a division, not simply between me-now and me-then,  
     but between discursive time and narrative time—a radical discontinuity which  
     ruptures the illusion of sequentiality and insists, embarrassingly, on self-presence and  
     voice; insists too that invocation itself may be more important than what is invoked.     
     (129) 
 
It is important that the division between “discursive time and narrative time” does not 
simply replace or supplant the more simplistic “me-now and me-then” binary. Instead, 
apostrophe compounds or complicates the poem’s “temporal scheme” by “signaling” the 
presence of a meta-textual voice—the voice of the poet-writing, or what has formerly 
been identified as a mode of “self-constituting self-address.” By these means, 
Wordsworth’s “two-consciousnesses” have been re-doubled: rather than reveal a 
straightforward negotiation between “I” and “some other being,” the poem now evinces a 
much more “perplexed epistemology” wherein each successive self is othered by an 
auditing voice. Wordsworth writes about Wordsworth-writing who is in turn writing 
about Wordsworth: the lyric “I” is not a stable, singular subject but a reflexive fiction 
which continually divulges—or at least exposes—its own conceit(s).  
 The results of this internecine, inward-turning struggle are evident in the text of 
the preamble. The “mind” which “turns” and turns once again, cycling through despair 
and hope, is caught within a meditative loop which (re)duplicates or parallels the path of 
the poet-writing, who is likewise trying to fix upon some coherent, stable self so that he 





the emotional antecedents of his current crisis is analogous to the “circumspection” of the 
text itself, which, due to its consummate self-awareness, is enacting the very process(es) 
it describes. Ultimately, the “glad preamble” is not merely an introduction to 
Wordsworth’s “crisis autobiography” but also a catalyst which actuates the poem’s 
autobiographical crisis: as Jacobus writes, “the ‘glad preamble’ initiates not only The 
Prelude, but the problem of its composition” (130). 
  Yet, because “composition” never means only “writing” (i.e., the literal act of 
inscription) but always denotes tandem processes of reading and writing, it might be 
more accurate to say that the preamble initiates the problem of reading which in turn 
initiates (indeed, becomes) The Prelude. Of course, “reading” has a rather expansive 
definition here, at once signifying the physical act of reading a written text and more 
intangible processes of self-reading, including introspection, self-analysis, and memory. 
Nevertheless, the most crucial of these is still the physical act itself—the very literal 
(re)reading of poetic texts which accompanied the first major revision and expansion of 
The Prelude in 1804-05. By necessity, all other “types” of reading—and for that matter, 
all other “figures of reading”—converge in this act: Wordsworth’s “overanxious eye” 
yields an overanxious “I,” and the poet is thus compelled to unfix and remake the poem 
in order to remake the idea of the Poet found therein.  
 The importance of the text’s physicality cannot be overestimated. However 
ponderous our abstractions, however intricate our critical systems, they cannot outweigh 
the concrete, material reality of the text as an artifact or surface which can be touched, 
written upon, manipulated, or effaced. To speak of a poem and of “remaking” that poem 





reworking which visibly alters the text in order to realize a re-(en)visioned idea. Any 
reading of The Prelude—no matter how resolute its conviction that the poem is a plural, 
unstable text—must ultimately return to the physical site of reading and writing. This is 
true not only for the critic but for Wordsworth himself. Revision begins in an actual 
encounter between writer and writing, poet and poem. De Man’s “specular moment” of 
alignment; the divide between two consciousnesses; ruptures between poetic past and 
present or between discursive and narrative time: all are ways of construing and 
understanding the ostensibly simple, quotidian act of reading a manuscript. 
 This simplification does not trivialize that encounter. Quite the contrary, it helps 
to explain precisely how and why Wordsworth continually revised his texts. The Prelude 
is an “achieved anxiety” because it is at once a means of negotiating a crisis and the 
source of that crisis: the poem no sooner dispels anxiety than it creates it anew. However, 
one cannot completely understand why the supposedly purgative process of writing (the 
poet’s “talking cure,” as it were) would induce further turmoil until one considers the 
materiality of the text. As an artifact, as an object external to the poet, the poem becomes 
separate from the poet—a “not-me” or Other to the poet’s own person. In the case of The 
Prelude, wherein the poet is the poem, this means that with every rereading, Wordsworth 
was confronting a self now fixed in time and text—a former self or “other being” who 
was in the past and therefore subject to the same ineffable vacancy between two 
consciousnesses. Given Wordsworth’s implicit need to bridge that gap, to maintain the 
“unique, unitary, transcendental subjectivity” of the Poet despite his awareness of the 
difficulties therein, this means that rereading must always yield revision (Mellor 298). 





continually updated to reflect the present poet or fixed by some unchanging, stable center 
which can endure the passage of time and preserve the ideality of the poetic subject.  
 For Wordsworth, the present was always a crisis in waiting. His response to the 
mutability and impermanence of the lyric “I” was therefore to delve into his past, wherein 
he believed he could find sufficient stability to perpetually restore the present poetic self. 
This method is evident not only in The Prelude but across the whole of his corpus. As 
M.H. Abrams writes, in Wordsworth’s poetry “the scene is a scene revisited”: his 
“favorite device of déjà vu” is a structural device employed so that the past may become 
present and the present may be fixed in both space and time (“Structure” 211). As 
Wordsworth readily concedes, such revisitation invariably results in reinterpretation. The 
scene is “made new” not merely because it has been invoked or called forth, but because 
it has been read or tapped as a source of restoration. 
Crucially, this type of “retrospective site reading” duplicates precisely what 
happens when Wordsworth revisits his texts. And since revisitation (or rereading) is 
almost always accompanied by revision, the structural device or organizing principle also 
determines the poet’s relationship with the text. Ultimately, the poem itself is a scene 
revisited: the “new” consciousness of the poet—his particular, present “I”—has been 
superimposed over the old.  
In this way, Wordsworth’s poetry habitually subverts the disparity between 
present and past, not by denying that difference but by attempting to negate it through a 
rewriting of the landscape / text itself. Yet reworking is also destruction—of previous 





and “obliterated readings” is most evident in Wordsworth’s famous “spots of time,” 
which are the central structural device of the Prelude in all its incarnations: 
     There are in our existence spots of time, 
     Which with distinct preeminence retain 
     A renovating virtue, whence, depressed 
     By false opinion and contentious thought, 
     Or aught of heavier or more deadly weight 
     In trivial occupations and the round  
     Of ordinary intercourse, our minds 
     Are nourished and invisibly repaired— (1805 XI.257-64) 
 
Wordsworth’s “spots” at once justify and constitute a method of reading or rereading the 
past: they are scenes or moments which “retain” their “renovating virtue” despite the 
vicissitudes of time and, therefore, offer a source and site of spiritual stability. Each 
representative “spot” follows a similar structure and scenario. First, the poet, wracked by 
current anxiety, uncertainty, or loss, describes a particularly poignant scene from his past 
(usually, childhood); then, in a representative moment of “after-meditation,” the poet 
reinterprets (often ambiguously) the scene so that it becomes a source of present succor, 
solace, or self-knowledge; finally, this knowledge is incorporated into the narrative thrust 
which constitutes the “growth of the poet’s mind.” The spot thereby becomes not simply 
an inert moment but an active “virtue” which restores, renovates, or repairs. 
Yet the spots are much more than an anodyne for the poet’s beleaguered mind. As 
Geoffrey Hartman writes, they have a peculiarly potent (and ambiguous) formal 
character: 
     It is hard to decide whether the first or second member of the partitive construction  
     “spots of time” should be emphasized. If we derive the origin of the notion from  
     Wordsworth’s attraction to specific place (the omphalos or spot syndrome), and notice  
     that “spot” is subtly used in two senses—as denoting particular places in nature, and  
     fixed points in time (“islands in the unnavigable depth / Of our departed time”)—the  
     emphasis would fall on the initial word. But the natural pull of the phrase, and the fact  





     vivifying temporal consciousness, throws the emphasis to the second noun and evokes  
     a beaconing “time-spot.” The concept is, in any case, very rich, fusing not only time  
     and place but also stasis and continuity. The fixity or fixation that points to an  
     apocalyptic consciousness of self is temporalized, reintegrated in the stream of life.  
     (212) 
 
The spots are not only in time but of time: they are focused “moments” of composition—
moments of (specular) alignment between those “mutually reflexive” Wordsworths who 
stare back at one another from the surface of the stream. Moreover, as the spots are 
moments of writing, the various versions of the spots—as found within each successive 
Prelude—become “spots” in their own right, though constituted of non-narrative time. 
Instead, for the later Wordsworth, these early texts of the Prelude would consist of spots 
of discursive time. In this way, the “spots of time” trope structures both the poem and 
Wordworth’s reading(s) of the poem: he has adopted or internalized the central figure of 
his own poem and made of it an active, applicable method or figure of reading. Thus, the 
mode of re-membering and re-enacting evident in the poetry itself is abstracted to 
Wordsworth’s compositional processes when re-experiencing (rereading) the poem as a 
whole. The poem itself provides the form or principle for the poet’s reconception of it; 
the formal aspects of the text(s) have become modes of thought. 
 But what process is at work here? What mechanism of (self-)consciousness is 
propelling revision? It is not enough to refer to the process as “anxiety” in a blanket 
sense; one must describe the relationship in terms which may eventually serve to explain 
not only the poet’s inward turn but the poetic atrophy which resulted from that turn. 
Wordsworth’s motivating anxiety was one of reading and writing, of autobiography, of 
the perceived vacancy between two consciousnesses—an anxiety which does not simply 





those processes (for they are ongoing) is yet undefined. Autobiography may well be a 
highly problematic “figure of reading” and “revision . . . the very trope of 
autobiography,” but this merely suggests perpetual change without positing a trajectory. 
To explain how an “autobiographical anxiety” could become not only a force which 
yielded revision but a force which provoked an ultimately corrosive form of revision, one 
needs both a means of understanding precisely what is at stake in the confrontation 
between present and past poetic selves and a means of assessing that struggle’s costs and 
consequences. As the next chapter will demonstrate, an apt frame for such an analysis can 



















Chapter 4: The “Anxiety of Influence” Turned Inward 
“Influence, as I conceive of it,”  Harold Bloom writes, “means that there are no 
texts, but only relationships between texts” (Map 3). What precisely he means by 
“influence” will require much elaboration. Nevertheless, the connection between his 
theory of poetry and my reading of Wordsworth begins at this statement. For Bloom, 
whose entire system depends on the presence of what he calls “intra-poetic 
relationships,”13 it represents an indispensable axiom; for me, it constitutes a way of 
thinking especially well-suited to Wordsworth, who truly attempted to shape his corpus 
into a single, profusely connected (and internally coherent) body. In order to understand 
Wordsworthian revision, one must have a way of describing the relationships between his 
texts or textualized selves. This is the most basic way in which I wish to employ the term 
“influence”: as a comprehensive figure, concept, or descriptor of those elemental forces 
which characterize the relationship(s) between successive versions of a poem and of the 
successive Wordsworths realized therein.  
To begin, one needs a working idea of Bloom’s theory of influence. Though 
highly complex and often abstruse, the essential argument in The Anxiety of Influence and 
A Map of Misreading may be summarized as follows: 
“Poetic influence” or “the anxiety of influence” refers primarily to the 
(ant)agonistic relationship between a new poet (the “ephebe”or “latecomer”) and an 
earlier poet (the “precursor”) wherein the ephebe, who implicitly feels overshadowed or 
overdetermined by the precursor, struggles to differentiate him- or herself from the 
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necessarily be “within.” This concept of a boundless inter-text also reveals the distinctly Deconstructive 





precursor, thereby attaining creative autonomy and imaginative priority. This antithetical 
process both compels and results from a “complex act of strong misreading” or “creative 
interpretation” of the precursor poem which Bloom calls “poetic misprision.” According 
to Bloom, poetic misprision is only the first in an interlocking and antithetical series of 
psychopoetic tropes / defenses whereby the ephebe either becomes a “strong poet” or 
falls short of that achievement. The practical efficacy of this theory of poetry lies in the 
fact that these six tropes offer  
     six interpretations of influence, six ways of reading/misreading intra-poetic  
     relationships, which means six ways of reading a poem, six ways that intend to  
     combine into a single scheme of complete interpretations, at once rhetorical,  
     psychological, imagistic and historical, though this is an historicism that deliberately  
     reduces to the interplay of personalities. But because my tropes are not tropes only,  
     but also psychic defenses, what I call “influence” is a figuration for poetry itself; not  
     as the relation of product to source, or effect to cause, but as the greater relation of  
     latecomer poet to precursor, or of reader to text, or of poem to the imagination, or of  
     the imagination to the totality of our lives. (Map 71) 
 
Bloom’s theory of intra-poetic relations thus aspires to become a totalizing, all-inclusive, 
omni-applicable trope of tropes which subsumes not only poetry qua poetry but also the 
Poet and the poetic psyche as such. Influence is conceived as a “metaphor for reading” in 
a context wherein “nothing is outside of the [poetic] text”: 
     Every poem we know begins as an encounter between poems. I am aware that poets  
     and their readers prefer to believe otherwise, but acts, persons, and places, if they are  
     to be handled by poems at all, must themselves be treated first as though they were  
     already poems, or parts of poems. Contact, in a poem, means contact with another  
     poem, even if that poem is called a deed, person, place or thing. What I mean by  
     “influence” is the whole range of relationships between one poem and another, which  
     means that my use of “influence” is itself a highly conscious trope, indeed a complex  
     sixfold trope that intends to subsume six major tropes: irony, synecdoche, metonymy,  
     hyperbole, metaphor, and metalepsis, and in just that ordering. (Map 70) 
 
While we need not delve into these subsidiary tropes, it is worth noting that Bloom never 





own theory. “A theory which presents itself as a severe poem,” he declares, “may be 
judged, and ask to be judged, as argument” (Anxiety 13).  
The avowedly rhetorical, self-consciously poetic character of the “anxiety of 
influence” comprises part of the reason why it constitutes an especially apposite means of 
addressing the problem of Wordsworth’s decline and the process of Wordsworthian 
revision. One does not need to accept Bloom’s argument in its entirety. Instead, one may 
adopt (and adapt) his theory based upon the efficacy of “influence” as a figure for 
reading Wordsworth within the decidedly rhetorical context of his poetic oeuvre. 
Previously, I have concluded that because The Prelude is a poem which implicitly forms 
its Poet, the relationship between Wordsworth’s palimpsestuous selves is fundamentally a 
relationship between texts. I have also insisted that what happens to the Poet-in-a-poem 
can have a profound impact on the poet-without the poem (or the poet-writing). I have 
not, however, presumed to venture outside of a specifically poetic context, nor would I 
insist that these conclusions are necessarily transferrable to any poet other than 
Wordsworth. Instead, I am relying on what I believe to be a sound hermeneutic principle: 
that a “theory about the self, in some sense, becomes the practice of a self which 
conditions the forms of future theorization. The same is true of any practice, including 
that of literature, of writing” (Waugh 16). 
Most critics consider Bloom’s theory especially problematic because it represents 
a highly suspect, even potentially dangerous sort of theory: namely, one which makes 
“evidence-free, globalizing pronouncements” and, because it cannot be tested (or 
refuted), is all too easily “regarded as a generalizing template” (Waugh 16). However, 





rhetoric. Indeed, in his original review of The Anxiety of Influence, de Man suggested 
that one might easily and usefully transfer Bloom’s concept of influence—and its 
associated “revisionary ratios”—from a primarily psychological context to one which 
was explicitly linguistic or rhetorical: 
     What is achieved by thus translating back from a subject-centered vocabulary of intent  
     and desire to a more linguistic terminology? If we admit that the term “influence” it  
     itself a metaphor that dramatizes a linguistic structure into a diachronic narrative, then  
     it follows that Bloom’s categories of misreading not only operate between authors, but  
     also between the various texts of a single author or, within a given text, between the  
     different parts, down to each particular chapter, paragraph, sentence, and, finally,  
     down to the interplay between literal and figurative meaning within a single word or  
     grammatical sign. (Blindness 276) 
 
De Man’s statements must be tempered: there is no value in reducing influence to such a 
particularized interplay of minutiae that one attempts to discern it “within a single word 
or grammatical sign.” Nevertheless, his suggestion that influence may operate between 
the texts of a single author is pivotal, for it allows one to use Bloom’s central concept (as 
well as many of its corollaries) while avoiding many of its pitfalls. The “anxiety of 
influence” may therefore lead us toward an understanding of the tropological agon 
manifest in Wordsworth’s poetry. By these means, we can not only understand how 
Wordsworth’s verse—in that autobiographical moment of anxiety—reacts upon itself and 
compels revision but also explain the motive force behind revision as a path to semantic 
and aesthetic decline.  
 The reason for combining Bloom’s system and de Man’s questioning perspective 
lies in what each “system” lacks: a degree of balance between skepticism and aesthetic 
positivism. While de Man grates against any “referential” function in literature, Bloom 
grants that a theory of criticism reliant on metaphor can nevertheless become a practical 





himself (who is a rhetorical effect anyway, though a substantial one). This allowance for 
a link between between textual effects and a more or less empirical, writing self allows 
one to demonstrate that what occurred within Wordsworth’s poetry, as a rhetorical effect, 
actually resulted in a substantial and real decline in the poet himself.  
 Yet even with that delimited context, I do not wish to appropriate Bloom’s theory 
wholesale. For this reason, I will not use the entirety of his “system” (including the 
majority of his revisionary ratios and their psychoanalytic or kabbalistic compliments). 
Instead, I will make use of his concept of misreading—of creative misreading as an 
attempt to “swerve” from one’s precursor and thereby sublimate anxiety; of “misprision” 
as an act of reading which seeks to create difference for the sake of maintaining the 
ephebe’s (illusions of) autonomy and priority; of influence itself, which is a “metaphor 
for reading” as a process which may limit and encumber the poet who does not manage to 
overcome his precursor. In and across the plural texts of the Prelude, the ongoing conflict 
between Wordsworth-reading and Wordsworth-writing (i.e., between the poet-writing 
and the poet figured in the text) at different “spots” in time enacts the dynamic of 
influence Bloom detects between ephebe and the poetic precursor. This schema of inter-
poetic relationships14 is applicable because it reaches toward certain axiomatic 
characteristics of Wordsworth’s revisionary processes—including, most notably, the fact 
that those processes are generated by mechanisms of self-consciousness produced by and 
constituent of autobiographical discourse. 
According to Bloom, “Poetic influence, or . . . poetic misprision is necessarily the 
study of the life-cycle of the poet-as-poet” (Anxiety 7). On this basis, he appropriates (and 
heavily revises) Freud, “predicating that these revisionary ratios have the same function 
                                                           





in intra-poetic relations that defense mechanisms have in our psychic life” (Anxiety 88). 
Reaction-formation, regression, repression, sublimation, introjections and projection—all 
are subsumed by Bloom’s “map of misreading,” which is essentially a deliberate and self-
conscious figure (“trope of tropes”) for the motions of the poetic ego. Perhaps as a result 
of his Freudian appropriations, Bloom is insistent that the anxiety of influence must 
necessarily arise from an encounter with poetic precursor or semi-Oedipal father: “We 
need to stop thinking of any poet as an autonomous ego, however solipsistic the strongest 
of poets may be,” he writes; “[e]very poet is a being caught up in a dialectical 
relationship (transference, repetition, error, communication) with another poet or poets” 
(Anxiety 91).  To some extent, this represents an eminently reasonable demystification of 
the poetic subject: poets are not, after all, formed in a vacuum, and the poetic psyche is 
just as subject to external stimuli as any other. 
Yet even as it appears to demystify poetic production, this movement outward 
towards other poets creates a similarly obscure rubric for the operation of influence 
within that “intra-poetic” network. Ultimately, what is left to chance—or, rather, left to 
the discretion of the critic—is the identification of an individual poet’s poetic 
precursor(s). And as the identification of influence-anxiety does not, as Bloom openly 
admits, necessarily depend on the critic’s identification of specific textual affinities, one 
is left with a substantial “gray area” wherein the only force at work is the critic’s own “I.” 
At this point, Bloom’s pronouncements become untenable. His readings of poets and 
their precursors, while often insightful, are questionable both because they lack a means 
of explicitly connecting the poems at hand and because they allow the network of 





though his theory depends explicitly on a precursor / ephebe dyad, he never conclusively 
demonstrates what, specifically, links these particular poets nor why one poetic father is 
any more dominant than another. The terms of each agon he cites are perpetually open to 
question. Thus, as the network expands outward to subsume a greater scope of intra-
poetic relationships, it becomes progressively more insubstantial.  
But what if we ground our judgments in an intra-poetic network we can be sure 
did exist? If influence is “a metaphor for reading,” then it stands to reason that one could 
both detect influence anxiety at work and trace its consequences with greater certainty 
when the processes of that reading are visible to the critical eye (Map 73). Bloom would 
no doubt object, as he does in response to de Man’s aforementioned proposal, that this 
represents a dangerously reductive perspective:  
     Paul de Man would insist that in the study of this struggle for reversal, the linguistic  
     model usurps the psychological one because language is a substitute system  
     responsive to the will, but the psyche is not. But that is to interpret the term  
     “influence” as one trope only, as a metaphor that transforms encounters between  
     linguistic structures into diachronic narratives. Influence would thus be reduced to  
     semantic tension, to an interplay between literal and figurative meanings. As the  
     sixfold, composite trope outlines above, influence remains subject-centered, a person- 
     to-person relationship, not to be reduced to the problematic of language. From the  
     viewpoint of criticism, a trope is just as much a concealed mechanism of defense, as a  
     defense is a concealed trope. The burden for readers continues to be that poetry,  
     despite all its protests, continues to be a discursive mode, whose structures evade the  
     language that would confine them. (Map 76-7) 
 
Bloom’s rebuttal, though forceful, relies too heavily upon a weak assumption: that to 
internalize influence-anxiety (in any sense) would necessarily mean its reduction to a 
purely “linguistic model” wherein the only tension at work is “semantic” and a “problem 
of language.” Granted, this is perhaps an apt response to de Man, for whom all (quite 
literally) is rhetoric. But if we accept that influence can remain “subject-centered” when 





“Poems,” Blooms writes, “are neither about ‘subjects’ nor about ‘themselves.’ They are 
necessarily about other poems; a poem is a response to a poem, as a poet is a response to 
a poet, as a person to his parent” (Map 18). Very well. But what happens when a poem is 
divided from itself and a poet from himself by the “vacancy” which intrudes between 
“two consciousnesses”? He also writes that “influence anxiety does not so much concern 
the forerunner but rather is an anxiety achieved in and by the story, novel, play, poem, or 
essay” (Anxiety xxiii). If, by means of this perpetual synecdoche, poets indeed are their 
poems, and if influence is a transaction between poems which occurs primarily because 
those poems are separated by time (which creates one precursor and one latecomer), then 
why could a poet (re)reading himself not be subject to the same sense of otherness, 
difference, and distance?  
Autobiography inevitably bifurcates the writing subject; Wordsworth-writing is 
not a single, unitary, transcendental self but a self radically divided in the very act of 
composing itself. When one adds to this the fact that Wordsworth, when he revised, was 
separated from a former self by “vacancies” of up to forty years, then there is no reason 
why one cannot internalize influence without any egregious reduction of the concept. 
Admittedly, some reduction is evident: one is no longer speaking of relationships across 
the ages but of only “the life-cycle of the poet as poet.” But this does not “cheapen” that 
process or reduce its visible impact upon the poem: an internalized anxiety of influence 
may well begin at semantic tension, but its impact is felt by the very real, very substantial 
poet himself. Circumscribing influence in such a way represents a more stable application 
of Bloom’s figure of reading. Poetic influence is indeed “a disease of self-consciousness” 





need not consist of such an obscure relationship between disparate persons. Wordsworth, 
whom Bloom calls “the great revisionist,” was very much driven by the need to 
overcome a precursor, but that precursor was not an external, spectral poetic father. 
Instead, the “Great Original” from which Wordsworth sought to wrest priority was a past 
version of himself—a Poet begat of a poem, fixed within that poem, and thereby 
antithetical to Wordsworth’s most urgent need, “the constant need to reaffirm his own 
genius and difference” (Hartman, “Revisited” 13).  
In summary: The Prelude is a poem born of crisis, of doubt, and of “the poet’s 
urgent need to constitute himself as poet” (Jacobus 128); its ends are poetic priority and 
creative autonomy, its means a return to, and creative (mis)reading of, the past. Yet 
because autobiography is never simply “about” the past but about the present, and 
because the poem could not suppress its awareness of the “vacancies”15 inherent to that 
form, Wordsworth was compelled to remake the poem each time the Poet therein 
appeared to countermand the poet-writing. In this context, previous texts were necessarily 
(re)figured as errors—misrepresentations of the poet Wordsworth wished himself to be. 
Other poems are therefore threats; for Wordsworth, this held true even when—especially 
when—those poems were his own. The resulting struggle for priority, fundamentally a 
struggle between texts, not only produces fresh composition but creates a need for 
difference. Rereading and rewriting thus converge in a comprehensive attempt to 
“swerve” from previous poem and Poet—or, more accurately, from the previous poet’s 
reading of the prior poem. Each successive version of The Prelude is essentially a 
“creative interpretation” or misreading of its precursor (Anxiety xxiii).  
                                                           





That said, misreading is not by default a constrictive or corrosive process. Quite 
to the contrary, it is often both a necessary and productive “revisionary ratio.” Further, to 
call the Prelude’s successive versions “misreadings” is not necessarily to suggest that 
there is an original, stable, superior meaning which the revised texts have somehow 
compromised: autobiographical writing always imposes difference, and thus a search for 
any unequivocal ur-text of past experience (even by the poet himself) seeks that which 
does not exist. Zachary Leader’s response to entrenched “earlier-is-better” arguments is 
correct: “ there is no necessary reason why poetry written ‘closer’ to the sources of 
Wordsworth’s inspiration should be any better than poetry written ‘further’ from it, 
particularly when we are talking—as is often the case with variant readings—of very 
short distances in time” (658-59). However, Leader has failed to recognize that 
Wordsworth’s revisions are not responses to or reinterpretations of any unmitigated, 
uncompromised “source” but rather responses to other readings. As Wordsworth himself 
so readily points out, memory is inherently a creative faculty that (re)interprets 
experience even in the act of recall. The temporal distance between experience and text 
or between text and revised text, though undeniably important, is therefore not the sole 
force driving and shaping revision. Instead, the distance between Wordsworth’s texts is a 
result of, first, the semantic polyphony which emerges in the act of reading; and second, 
the consequent imposition of layers of interpretation—layers which vitiate and obscure 
meaning not because they fail to capture any essential center, but because they introduce 
readings which incessantly question the very grounds of their own existence. As Susan 
Wolfson writes, “Wordsworth’s sensitivity to ‘other possible answers’ remains an 





“deconstructive questioning” yields a mode of poetry which first figures past readings as 
errors only to then reinscribe a new error via misreading which will, in turn, subsequently 
be subject to the same self-conscious critique. Ultimately, the quality of Wordsworth’s 
poetry suffers not because the poet has grown old, but because the poem, site and source 
of anxiety, has taken its own methods of reading to an unparalleled extreme. The scene 
has become a scene too often revisited, and the resulting traffic of readings overwhelms 
gestures toward clarity and fixity. With every revision, The Prelude attempts to claim 
imaginative priority for this moment and this poet, but the changes necessary to do so 
usurp the basis of their own textual authority.  
In the following, the goal will not be to look for changes to the text which 
explicitly demonstrate qualitative decline. Because it treats revisions as effects of an 
extraneous diminishment, such a “comparative” reading would inevitably fail to consider 
how those revisions are causes of the same process they signify. Instead, I am looking for 
moments of alignment between “two consciousnesses,” moments of (self-)reading 
wherein the differences between the Prelude’s plural texts divulge the poet-writing’s 
literal re-visioning of a previous textual self. In these moments, one can track the ongoing 
struggle between the poet-writing and precursor texts. Ultimately, this will make it 
possible to not only detect the presence of an “anxiety of influence” but to reach certain 
conclusions about the effects, costs, and consequences of that anxiety. 
Since one cannot possibly attend to every significant moment of revision in The 
Prelude, it is necessary to focus on a small number of representative sites or scenes of 
misreading. As it happens, the poem itself provides a principal of selection via its reliance 





corpus, the “spots of time” are the functional center of The Prelude. Within the poem, 
they act as both the dominant structural motif and the central trope, organizing and 
producing meaning. Further, the “spots of time” are present in all versions of the Prelude, 
and in every version they are the bedrock upon which the rest of the poem is built, either 
functioning as semantic centers (“primal scenes,” as it were) or climactic sequences.  
In the 1799 Prelude, the spots are not only key moments, but constitute the bulk 
of the text. The most prominent of these sequences include the “Drowned Man of 
Esthwaite Water,” the “Murderer at Penrith / Beacon on the Summit,” “Waiting for 
Horses,” and the “Stolen Boat”; but practically every significant movement of the poem 
abides by the pattern of description and reflection essential to a “spot.” In the transition to 
the intermediate five book version of 1804, all of the spots are retained and some 
dispersed, but now the previously quoted spots of time “thesis” and its contiguous 
episodes (the “Murderer at Penrith” and “Waiting for Horses”) become the terminal 
movement of the poem, thus amplifying their importance. Concomitantly, the ascent of 
Mount Snowdon, which first appears at the opening of the fifth book of the Five Book 
Prelude (notably, as the climax which precedes the resolution formed by the central spot 
sequence), is itself another instance of a “spot of time”—a scene meant to become, as it 
were, the “highest” spot of the poem as a whole. And although this arrangement will be 
further altered with the expansion to thirteen and finally fourteen books (in 1805 and 
1850, respectively), the spots will once again retain their importance: they are, 
evocatively, the means by which an “impaired” imagination is “restored.”  
Given all of these facts, it is clear that the spots are focal points for revision—both 





them in order to track the processes of misreading constituent of and produced by 
Wordsworth’s revisions. To further narrow analysis and facilitate inter-textual reading, 
the remainder of my argument will focus on the central “spots of time” sequence, which 
contains the “spots of time” thesis, “Murderer at Penrith,” and “Waiting for Horses.” The 
sequence may be found at the following points in the texts of The Prelude: 1799: I.288-
374; Five Book Prelude: V.280-389; 1805: XI.257-395; and 1850: XII.208-335. 
We have already discussed the extra-textual importance of the “spots of time” 
trope and considered the structure of that “epic simile” which was “launched to image the 
perplexed epistemology of writing and reading autobiography” (Wolfson, Formal 128). 
We have also concluded (tentatively) that Wordsworth’s explication of the formal 
problems implicit to autobiography provides the most accessible (and internally coherent) 
means of reading The Prelude. Thus, prior to reading the spots as they exist in different 
versions of the poem, we may describe the following scenario: The different texts of the 
“spots” are themselves “spots” (places, times) of reading, and constitute an enacted 
“specular moment” wherein the poet, “incumbent o’er the surface of past time,” attempts 
to read what he believes to be an “original” experience. However, this reading is 
frustrated and impaired because the texts and their implicit interpretations are interfering 
with his vision: he is effectively reading through the Wordsworth on the surface—i.e., the 
Wordsworth-writing in the past. As versions multiply and interpretations compound, the 
surface becomes more complex and more opaque, and the anxiety of “other selves” 
grows more acute. Wordsworth’s attempts to penetrate the patina of “after-meditation” 
must follow suit, and therefore grow increasingly more forceful and intricate. The 





to ensure that later revisitations of the spot or scene will be even more difficult. In an 
attempt to fend off the volleys of these accrued selves, the character of subsequent 
revisions will become increasingly more defensive. Difference is imposed as a bulwark 
against an incipient deluge of former readings. 
 Although the combative terms of this description might make it appear 
hyperbolic, such rhetoric is justified given the extrinsic and intrinsic torsion of the spots 
of time. To begin, consider the central statement of Wordsworth’s master-trope. In the 
inaugural “Two-Part Prelude,” the “spots of time” thesis reads as follows: 
     There are in our existence spots of time 
     Which with distinct preeminence retain 
     A fructifying virtue, whence, depressed 
     By trivial occupations and the round 
     Of ordinary intercourse, our minds— 
     Especially the imaginative power— 
     Are nourished and invisibly repaired; 
     Such moments chiefly seem to have their date 
     In our first childhood. (1.288-96) 
 
In the “Five Book Prelude,” the line is end-stopped at “repaired” and the terminal clause 
opened up: 
     Such moments, worthy of all gratitude,  
     Are scattered everywhere, and take their date  
     In our first childhood – in our childhood even 
     Perhaps are most conspicuous. (5.287-89) 
 
But the only significant change is the suggestion that the spots are more numerous and 
diffuse in memory than previously supposed. However, by 1805 the passage has been 
altered to include a more substantial, rhetorically weighty description of the forces 
“depressing” the mind and a second iteration of the sentence’s principal subject, “virtue”: 
     There are in our existence spots of time, 
     Which with distinct preeminence retain 





     By false opinion and contentious thought, 
     Or aught of heavier or more deadly weight 
     In trivial occupations and the round  
     Of ordinary intercourse, our minds 
     Are nourished and invisibly repaired— 
     A virtue, by which pleasure is enhanced, 
     That penetrates, enables us to mount 
     When high, more high, and lifts us up when fallen. (1805 XI.257-67) 
 
In and of itself, this revision places considerably more emphasis upon the spot’s 
“renovating” potential: “virtue” is supplied with not only two restorative functions 
(“nourished” and “repaired”) but also with a series of brusque, forceful, ameliorative 
verbs (“enhanced,” “penetrates,” “enables,” “mount,” “lifts”) which, accompanying the 
rolling rhythm of the line, ascend toward a tranquil yet triumphant syntactical plateau. 
Yet what is even more significant is the exclusion of the formerly brisk transition into the 
first actual “spot.” In 1799, the “Murderer at Penrith” begins immediately after the 
conclusion of the opening sentence (at “childhood”); in the “Five Book Prelude,” the 
onset of the spot is delayed only slightly; but in the 1805 text, one finds a newly 
interpolated passage of eleven lines and three sentences, which reads as follows: 
     This efficacious spirit chiefly lurks 
     Among those passages of life in which 
     We have had deepest feeling that the mind 
     Is lord and master, and that outward sense 
     Is but the obedient servant of her will. 
     Such moments, worthy of all gratitude, 
     Are scattered everywhere, taking their date 
     From our first childhood—in our childhood even 
     Perhaps are most conspicuous. Life with me, 
     As far as memory can look back, is full 
     Of this beneficent influence. (1805, XI.268-78) 
 
This extended description of the “efficacious spirit” amplifies the potential strength of the 
spots but concomitantly circumscribes where or what they may be: they are to consist of 





(sensory experience) by fiat, subjugating everything extrinsic to its will. Though 
accomplished in relatively few lines, Wordsworth’s rereading of the master-trope will 
inflect the entirety of the principal “spots of time” sequence and do so in a manner which 
amply evinces influence-anxiety at work. His revisions reveal the following: 
First, a more deliberate, drastic, and even violent attempt to compensate for some 
perceived loss. In the first version of the passage, the mind is “depressed” only by the 
quotidian motions of “trivial occupations and the round / Of ordinary intercourse,” and 
the “fructifying virtue” of the spot is sufficient to nourish and invisibly repair any 
consequent impairment of the imaginative power. In later versions, the weight of 
depressive forces becomes “heavier” and even “deadly,” and the equal and opposite 
compensatory motion redoubles as well, gaining sufficient force to become not only 
strong but overpowering. The mind is no longer a passive entity which receives or 
absorbs the healing influx of memory, but a tyrannical agent which accomplishes what 
Geoffrey Hartman has famously termed the “apocalypse of the imagination”—an 
absolute domination over external phenomena. This shift is also evident in the subtle but 
incredibly significant change from “fructifying virtue” to “vivifying virtue”16 to 
“renovating virtue”: whereas “fructifying,” in context, would mean that the mind is made 
more fruitful and productive, and “vivifying” would signify an animating, quickening 
virtue which brightens or sharpens the mind, “renovating” implies a more decisive sort of 
repair—repair not only as the literal mending of what is present, but as a literal remaking 
or making anew. The difference lies in the perceived depth of the wound or loss which 
each sort of virtue is meant to address: the first reactivates, the second enlivens, the third 
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literally rebuilds. By the 1805 version, then, Wordsworth’s text implies that some 
creative cataclysm has taken place, and that the damage must be countered by an equally 
potent compensatory agent. The height of the poet’s climb in the second iteration of 
“virtue” is a direct consequence of the depth of his descent. 
Having taken note of this amplified sense of loss, we are naturally directed back 
to the actual content of the crisis at hand—which (although easy to lose sight of when 
reading in isolation) is the “impairment of imagination” or the sudden stymieing of the 
creative faculty. In 1799, The Prelude begins on a note of crisis: Wordsworth has failed 
to write the poem he thinks he ought to (The Recluse), and thus he asks—in the midst of 
that creative anxiety—if it was for this sad state of creative anxiety, idleness, or 
consternation that he had been tutored by his beloved River Derwent. In this instance, the 
crisis is very much a present crisis: the poem sets out to bridge the poetic impasse 
introduced by its opening question. Yet in the 1805 text, where the sequence is not only 
removed to the eleventh book but wholly divorced from such immediacy, loss is 
something which has already happened: the mind does not need to be merely opened up 
or revitalized, but actively rebuilt and made new again. What’s more, the expected result 
of that process of remaking is apotheosis—a state high as the lowest lows (actually, even 
“more high”), and of disproportionate positive strength. The “virtue” at hand is thus 
afforded an increasing amount of semantic and structural heft. It is as if the poet is trying 
to not simply achieve imaginative priority but to seize it by means of decisive and 
unilateral action.  
The revisions to this opening sequence thus evince a misreading which amplifies 





master a present anxiety. Yet this anxiety has already been amplified by the very act of 
revisiting that scene of creative stagnation: the scene gains force through repetition.17 
Whereas the “virtue” of the time-spots was once contained in a relatively terse and almost 
organic formula, it is now figured as a polymorphous form or source of discursive power 
which above all seeks to be “penetrating” and “efficacious.” This more authoritarian, 
positivistic interpretation of the spots trope is fundamentally a defense against anteriority: 
the “spots” are at once brought more forcefully into this present and adapted to the 
(formal, semantic) demands of the remade Prelude, which has a vastly enlarged scope. 
The poet is not the old poet and the poem not the old poem; the immediacy of the 1799 
spots sequence—with its spare definition and clearly defined, unembellished edges—has 
been supplanted by a reading which attempts to more decisively fix function and 
meaning. 
Turning to the 1850 text, we find that another decisive shift—this time, perhaps a 
hardening—has occurred. The newly revised passage reads as follows: 
     This efficacious spirit chiefly lurks 
     Among those passages of life that give 
     Profoundest knowledge to what point, and how, 
     The mind is lord and master—outward sense 
     The obedient servant of her will. Such moments 
     Are scattered everywhere, taking their date 
     From our first childhood. I remember well, . . . (1850 12.19-25) 
 
For the most part, this version of the passage appears to be a taut, economical rendering 
of the 1805 text. Despite condensing eleven lines to seven and three sentences to two, it 
retains many of the elements introduced by its precursor. However, the slight differences 
                                                           
17 In returning to the poem, Wordsworth is experiencing that state of blockage again, not only in figurative 
terms but also literally. Recall, for example, that evidence points to a scenario wherein every time progress 
on The Recluse was stifled (as it would be again and again), Wordsworth would turn to his 
autobiographical poem for solace and succor. The irony of the situation is that this defense and supposed 





are telling. For example, consider the change from “those passages of life in which / We 
have had deepest feeling that the mind / Is lord and master” to “those passages of life that 
give / Profoundest knowledge to what point, and how, / The mind is lord and master . . . ” 
(emphasis added). In the former version, the “passages of life” (the spots) are located in a 
moment wherein we “have had deepest feeling”—meaning, they are coincident with that 
feeling. In the latter, these same passages “give” instead, which implies a separation 
(temporal or spatial) between the spot or experience which is giving and the mind which 
is receiving (emphasis added). When coupled with the contrast between “deepest feeling” 
and “Profoundest knowledge,” this revision suggests an attempt to fix the spots in / as an 
external “source” which might be interpreted, manipulated, and controlled according to 
the will of the poet. Knowing “to what point, and how” something works is the 
equivalent of making it an impersonalized object of study. Paradoxically, this attempt to 
control the spots on one front is coupled with a diminishment of the apparent authority 
granted the mind; the poet’s deepest feeling no longer tells him that the mind is 
unequivocally lord and master but instead presupposes that there is a point (an upper 
limit) and a way (a delimited means of operation) determining how extensive the mind’s 
government over “outward sense” can actually be.   
Though it may appear to contradict previous comments about the control a 
subsequent text attempts to exercise over its precursor, one must realize that a tempering 
or lessening is also a form of interpretive control. “All restitutions or representations,” 
Bloom writes, “induce fresh anxieties, and the influence process continues by a 
compensatory fresh limitation . . . ” (Map 72). In other words, one poem’s defense 





will not always be an act of overt domination. Often, it will take the form of an 
antithetical movement (or swerve) away from the previous poem, even if the specific 
limitation, substitution, or restitution appears to be a concession to the precursor’s 
potency. Furthermore, Wordsworth’s implicit doubt concerning the extent of the mind’s 
power to dominate “outward sense”—however stringent his control of syntax—speaks to 
a discernable pattern in the relationship(s) between his texts: a supplementary yet often 
unpredictable vacillation between what Wolfson terms “floating and fixing” (Formal 
101). One must keep this antinomy in mind; patterns of misreading may not abide by 
static principles. Instead, the shape of the text’s movement away from its precursor, and 
the result(s) of that movement, will always depend upon a very specific collision of 
contexts.  
Involuted questionings aside, the “lord and master” addition to the “spots of time” 
sequence also initiates another consummately Wordsworthian response to the anxiety of 
influence: a reflexive or inward turn wherein poetry becomes meta-poetic—or, in simpler 
terms, a moment of writing about writing. Whereas the 1799 Prelude, as Jonathan 
Wordsworth aptly observes, contains very little material which is explicitly about 
writing, the superbly self-conscious 1805 Prelude continually reflects upon its own 
compositional processes. Thus, when one encounters the phrase “passages of life” at line 
269 (emphasis added), the double entendre can hardly be a coincidence. “Manuscripts as 
well as memories constitute [Wordsworth’s] past,” and the passages of his life are at once 
analogous to and enshrined within the lines of his poetry (Wolfson, Formal 104). Given 
the shift toward poetry as a subsurface subject, the shift from “deepest feeling” to 





back around to a previous interpretation, more evidence of the poet’s attempt to distance 
himself from (and thus defend himself against) the 1805 Prelude’s forceful reading of the 
potency of the poetic mind. Yet the hint present in “passages” mostly anticipates the 
much more explicit and resonant meta-poetic meditations beginning at line 293 in the 
1805 Prelude: 
     The gibbet-mast was mouldered down, the bones 
     And iron case were gone, but on the turf 
     Hard by, soon after that fell deed was wrought, 
     Some unknown hand had carved the murderer’s name. 
     The monumental writing was engraven 
     In times long past, and still from year to year 
     By superstition of the neighborhood 
     The grass is cleared away; and to this hour 
     The letters are all fresh and visible. 
     Faltering, and ignorant where I was, at length 
     I chanced to espy those characters inscribed 
     On the green sod: . . . . (1805 11.293-301) 
 
The equivalent passage in the 1850 text reads as follows: 
     The gibbet-mast had mouldered down, the bones 
     And iron case were gone; but on the turf, 
     Hard by, soon after that fell deed was wrought, 
     Some unknown hand had carved the murderer’s name. 
     The monumental letters were inscribed 
     In times long past; but still, from year to year, 
     By superstition of the neighborhood, 
     The grass is cleared away, and to that hour 
     The characters were fresh and visible: 
     A casual glance had shown them, and I fled, 
     Faltering and fain, and ignorant of the road: (1850 12. 237-47) 
 
Significantly, this portion of the main descriptive sequence constituting the “Murderer at 
Penrith” episode is absent from the five book and two book versions of The Prelude. As 
such, it constitutes an entirely different reading of the scene. While the early incarnations 
of the poem fix the murderer’s resting place in a “long green ridge of turf . . . / Whose 





means of a written marker. Moreover, this shift in the means whereby death is “read” is 
accompanied by an equally significant alteration to the tone of the passage: whereas the 
young Wordsworth simply departs the site of the murderer’s death in the early versions 
with no mention of panic or fear (“I left the spot / And, reascending the bare slope . . .”), 
the child in the later versions is obviously frightened. Although both texts explicitly 
connect the child’s panic to the writing (the writing is mentioned prior to his leaving the 
spot, and thus becomes a possible cause by proximity), and although both mention a 
hasty retreat from the scene, the 1850 text makes this much more explicit: “Faltering, and 
ignorant where I was, at length / I chanced to espy those characters inscribed / On the 
green sod: forthwith I left the spot” becomes “A casual glance had shown them, and I fled 
/ Faltering and fain, and ignorant of the road” (emphasis added). 
 Of course, the child’s fear is perfectly explicable, and one might well read the 
1850 text’s emphasis on panic as Wordsworth’s attempt to make the scene more dynamic 
or dramatic. Nevertheless, this sense of apprehension, urgency, and anxiety is connected 
explicitly to written language; it is as if this particular passage of life has internalized the 
anxieties of the mature poet, substantiating his fear not only of crises related to writing 
but of stagnant, static, “engraven,” “inscribed,” or fixed letters and language. The name 
carved on the turf (notably, a name omitted from the text) is Death metonymically 
configured; by extension, mortality consists of being written down—permanently—in a 
form which cannot be altered or revised. In her study of Wordsworthian revision, Susan 
Wolfson explains this aversion to textual fixity as follows: 
     Once a specter shape is given a definite form and is turned into a simulacrum of a  
     literary artifact, the life of the subjective eye and I, produced by motion and ferment,  
     dies. Long before de Man articulated the negativity behind language, Wordsworth  





Without venturing too deeply into a discussion of the alignment between fixity and death 
(note Wordsworth’s famous line, “lifeless as a written book”), and of revision as “the 
energy which postpones death and quickens the mind”18 (Wolfson, Formal 131), it is 
nevertheless important to note how this interpretation of “monumental writing” pertains 
to our discussion of “spots of time” (in all of the aforementioned senses) and spots, or 
moments, of self-reading. To put it succinctly, the amplified sense of panic visible in the 
1850 text is, first, a manifestation of Wordsworth’s anxieties concerning the viability of 
his efforts to read the past; and second, a sign and exemplary instance of the revisionary 
ratio (or mode of misreading) which dominates and eventually attenuates Wordsworth’s 
later poetry. Here, in the transition from the 1805 to 1850 texts, there is a discernable 
pattern of “fixing” sites, spots, and scenes that reveals the later Wordsworth’s attempts to 
stabilize, clarify, and therefore usurp previous readings. However, the poet’s effort to 
refine and preserve the spots of time has an unintended consequence: “monumental 
writing” becomes one of the text’s dominant figures of / for reading, and that figure 
enacts the duality the phrase portends. 
 The evidence for this pattern of misreading is profuse. First, one finds explicit 
indicators in a series of grammatical changes: “The gibbet-mast was mouldered down” 
becomes “the gibbet-mast had mouldered down,” suggesting, by means of a tense shift, 
that the later narrator has extirpated himself from the scene. This is reinforced by the 
change, a few lines later, from “to this hour / The letters are all fresh and visible” to “to 
that hour / The characters were all fresh and visible.” Though subtle,  these alterations 
drastically alter the dynamic of Wordsworth’s spot-reading: in the 1805 text, he revisits 
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the scene and actively participates in it; in the 1850 text, the scene is placed at arm’s 
length—still possessed of potency, no doubt, but diluted. Even more curious, however, is 
the puzzling transposition of the terms used to describe the murderer’s epitaph: 
“monumental writing” becomes “monumental letters”; “engraven” becomes “inscribed”; 
“letters” become “characters”; and the 1805’s final, direct reference to the writing—“to 
espy those characters inscribed”—is effaced entirely in favor of the anomalous, pronoun-
dulled phrase “A casual glance had shown them.” In concert, these changes enact a 
disintegration of language into its component parts: “Writing,” which suggests the 
possibility of reading and therefore of discernable meaning, deconstructs into “letters,” 
which are but disconnected symbols when not put into a viable order; likewise, “letters” 
(already disconnected symbols) become completely undefined “characters” which, 
despite being “fresh and visible,” are basically meaningless. While one could argue 
convincingly that the disintegration of language here is symbolic of the de-facement 
imposed by death (once again, the murderer is never named), the combined weight of the 
child’s panic at the sight of writing and this linguistic disintegration also justify a more 
meta-poetic reading. Ultimately, the 1850 Prelude refigures language as an inherently 
diminished thing. The fact that the letters and characters cannot be put into order or even 
identified is evocative of the illegibility of the past. Like this spot, texts cannot be fully or 
accurately read. 
 Despite Wordsworth’s acute awareness of fundamental (and perhaps ineradicable) 
“vacancies” permeating autobiographical discourse, the text of The Prelude refuses to 
completely abandon the attempt to read and derive value from the spots of time. As a 





they are presumably “enshrining, / . . . the spirit of the Past / For future restoration,” 
Wordsworth’s revisions work to countermand the spots’ restorative potential by disabling 
their viability in the present. By virtue of Wordsworth’s alterations, the 1850 text 
interposes an insurmountable distance between the reader / poet (who is attempting to 
derive value from them) and the source or site of the “renovating virtue.” Just before the 
opening to the 1850 reading of “Waiting for Horses,” Wordsworth interjects a rather 
hasty, abrupt, and unbalanced transition which reads, “Yet another of these memorials.” 
This apparently inconsequential segue is an uncannily apt description of the 
consequences of Wordsworth’s misreading: the spots of time, conceived and 
implemented as a means of actively restoring the imagination to its full potential, are 
essentially petrified—writ large, yes, but also written down and engraven in a manner 
which no longer permits them to adapt to the exigencies of the poet’s present. Reading 
these spots is not the active, phenomenological exercise it once was; it has now become 
an exercise in reading gravestones, epitaphs, and “memorials”—static, dead things. Given 
these conclusions, the effect of influence-anxiety and the consequences of Wordsworth’s 
misreading of his previous self are clear. In the effort to render himself a “monumental” 
presence, to “enshrine” his poetry and preserve it for posterity, Wordsworth has also 
opened his text to a stultifying and deadening process of reification: images harden, 
metaphor and symbol solidify, and the “spots of time” become memories which were and 
not the perpetually active founts of “something evermore about to be” (1805 6.542) 
Frances Ferguson’s comments on this matter are especially apt: 
     The poet’s spiritual autobiography virtually constitutes a series of epitaphs spoken     
     upon former selves, “other Beings,” who can be approached only across vacancies  
     almost as wide as those between the living and the dead. And Wordsworth’s revisions  





     themes of growth and immortality never stand far from the theme of death. (155) 
 
Of course, this is not an all-encompassing, omni-vitiating process: even by 1850—
indeed, even today—Wordsworth’s poetry still “lives.” Nevertheless, this aspect of the 
text exemplifies the process of involuted self-questioning which ultimately led 
Wordsworth not just to compulsively revise his material but to attempt to change it by 
means of imposing obfuscating layers of (re)interpretation.  
One might object that Wordsworth is renowned for his ability to make dead things 
speak: Margaret of The Ruined Cottage, Lucy, the various solitaries and wraiths and 
vagrants spread throughout his corpus—all are examples of the productive use of 
prosopopoeia, which makes epitaphs (of whatever type) much more than simply 
collections of static, anonymous “characters.” The evidence to support this point is 
undeniable. Nevertheless, the torpor of “monumental writing” is not the only process of 
misreading at work in the central “spots of time” sequence. Other moments therein 
exemplify the same internecine struggle. 
 The most important of these moments consists of the following: 
     When in blessed season, 
     With those two dear ones—to my heart so dear— 
     When, in the blessed time of early love, 
     Long afterwards I roamed about 
     In daily presence of this very scene, 
     Upon the naked pool and dreary crags, 
     And on the melancholy beacon, fell 
     The spirit of pleasure and youth’s golden gleam— 
     And think ye not with radiance more divine 
     From these remembrances, and from the power 
     They left behind? So feeling comes in aid 
     Of feeling, and diversity of strength 
     Attends us, if but once we have been strong. (1805 11.315-27) 
 





     When, in the blessed hours 
     Of early love, the loved one at my side, 
     I roamed, in daily presence of this scene, 
     Upon the naked pool and dreary crags, 
     And on the melancholy beacon fell 
     A spirit of pleasure and youth’s golden gleam; 
     And think ye not with radiance more sublime 
     For these remembrances, and for the power 
     They had left behind? So feeling comes in aid 
     Of feeling, and diversity of strength 
     Attends us, if but once we have been strong. (1850 12.261-71) 
 
Right away, one detects the same sort of diminishment cited previously: a period 
described as a “blessed season” and “blessed time” in 1805 becomes 1850’s paltry 
“blessed hours.” Time itself has atrophied, and the spot where Wordsworth “roamed 
about / In daily presence of this very scene” seems hardly capable of providing or 
sustaining any type of restorative power. However, the more crucial difference is found 
between the following lines:  
     And think ye not with radiance more divine   
     From these remembrances, and from the power        
     They left behind? (emphasis added) 
 
     And think ye not with radiance more sublime 
     For these remembrances, and for the power 
     They had left behind? (emphasis added) 
 
The choice to replace “divine” with “sublime” is curious in and of itself, and perhaps 
indicates Wordsworth’s later reluctance to ascribe absolute “divinity” to a faculty of the 
human mind. That said, this passage is especially pivotal because it defines how the 
“power” of the spots actually operates. Such a need for definition is, first of all, 
illustrative of the poet’s inward-turning mind: Wordsworth has essentially become a 
critical reader of his own master trope. The difference between the definitions offered 





seems a rather innocent alteration in prepositions actually alters the entire character of a 
“spot of time.”  
 First, consider the prepositions encompassing and linking the most crucial terms 
in the passage, “remembrances” and “power.” “From,” in the 1805 text, characterizes the 
spot and its constituent site, memory, or scene as the origin of “radiance divine.” The 
spot is therefore spatiotemporal: it is a place and a time wherein a time-spot (memory, or 
the “remembrances”) has become a localized scene (spot of time), and thereby permitted 
a doubly productive and doubly powerful fusion of past and place. The “remembrances” 
therein described are still available as sources of restorative radiance, for the power they 
“left behind” persists. 
 On the other hand, 1850’s “For” disables the present viability of the spot. It 
signifies “because of” and therefore imposes a separation between the spot (cause) and 
“radiance sublime” (effect). The remembrances have become reasons or causes for 
radiance: they are no longer doubly resonant; they are solely temporal (fixed in time) and 
not spatial, which deprives them of the capacity to act as a scene or text revisited. The 
effect of the preposition is only enhanced by the shift from “they left behind” to “they 
had left behind.” Moving from the simple past to the past perfect, the emended text looks 
back from a certain time in the past to tell what had happened before. This means that the 
spot or memory is no longer happening, and thus no longer viable. Revision therefore 
renders the spot’s power belated and impotent: it is, as it were, a static memorial.  
This reading of belatedness finds further support a few lines later in the following 
lines, first from 1805: 
     The days gone by 





     Of life; the hiding-places of my power 
     Seem open, I approach, and then they close; (1805 11.333-36) 
 
And then from 1850: 
 
     The days gone by 
     Return upon me almost from the dawn 
     Of life: the hiding-places of man’s power 
     Open; I would approach them, but they close. (1850 12.277-80) 
 
Once again, the actual changes are slight, but the effect of those changes is considerable. 
In 1805, Wordsworth actually attempts to approach the “hiding places” of his power, but 
they close before he can reach them. By 1850, the power has not only been 
impersonalized (no longer “my” power but “man’s”), but the poet also no longer even 
attempts to approach: he would do so, but they have already closed. Further, although it 
might initially seem to undermine such a reading, the absence of “seems” in the later text 
actually amplifies the effect of the poet’s immobility. In 1850 the “hiding places” 
definitely “open,” but they do so only to close with equal force and thus blatantly rebuke 
the poet. Once again, the 1850 Prelude demonstrates its tendency to fix scenes, images, 
and (here) positions in a more definitive form. The purgation of “seems” from the text—
in all senses—means that any perceived lack, any failure, and any closing must be more 
final.  
 That said, the aforementioned change is significant predominantly because of how 
it inflects the lines which follow in both the 1805 and 1850 texts: “I see by glimpses now, 
when age comes on / May scarcely see at all . . .” In 1805, the poet’s anxiety is potent 
enough; but by 1850, his blindness has become more severe. The later poet is immobile, 
and the gravity fixing him in place further darkens the sense of his capacity to “see” in 





Ultimately, these lines represent Wordsworth’s most direct (and poignant) lament 
at a perceived lack of poetic authority or priority—losses he, like his later readers, 
believes to be the consequence of age and a perceived lack of vision. He will, however, 
struggle for priority all the same—indeed, he is doing precisely that by doing what his 
younger self cannot: rewriting the poem. This portion is conspicuously absent in the 1799 
and the five-book versions: in 1805, therefore, one witnesses for the first time a new 
anxiety of “sight” (or priority, or poetic vision) and a consequently magnified fear of 
mortality. 
Finally, we have the closing portions of the central “spots of time” sequence, first 
in 1805: 
     All these were spectacles and sounds to which 
     I often would repair, and thence would drink 
     As at a fountain. And I do not doubt  
     That in this later time, when storm and rain 
     Beat on my roof at midnight, or by day 
     When I am in the woods, unknown to me 
     The workings of my spirit thence are brought. (1805 11.82-88) 
 
And in 1850: 
 
     All these were kindred spectacles and sounds 
     To which I oft repaired, and thence would drink, 
     As at a fountain; and on winter nights, 
     Down to this very time, when storm and rain 
     Beat on my roof, or, haply, at noon-day, 
     While in a grove I walk, whose lofty trees, 
     Laden with summer’s thickest foliage, rock 
     In a strong wind, some workings of the spirit, 
     Some inward agitations thence are brought, 
     Whate’er their office, whether to beguile 
     Thoughts over busy in the course they took, 
     Or animate an hour of vacant ease. (1850 12.324-35) 
 
Until 1805, this passage persists in a more or less stable form, though a subsequent 





somewhat weaken their net effect. However, in 1850 he expands and drastically 
attenuates the lines, adding excessive qualification in an attempt to describe how (and 
why), exactly, these spectacles and sounds returned. As a result, the preceding spots of 
time are rendered somewhat impotent, or at least of vastly diminished importance. In 
these revised lines, the “spots of time” sequence—structural and semantic center of The 
Prelude—has become something which simply permits the Poet to calm unruly thoughts 
or enliven “an hour of vacant ease.” Of course, such hours of ease or tranquility 
frequently have great significance for Wordsworth; after all, it is the emotions recollected 
in those moments which gather to form a poem. Nevertheless, one cannot completely 
disregard the sense of loss or diminishment which emerges from a parallel reading: the 
moments which previously evinced such urgency have somehow been domesticated. 
“Animate” may be an inherently lively verb, but it cannot thwart the semantic 
complacency of “beguile.” As such, the “vacant ease” these lines reference indicates less 
a serene interval of tranquility than a period of manifest boredom.  
 This terminal deflation is the sequence’s final and perhaps most pronounced 
instance of misreading. Wordsworth is not deliberately subverting his own master-trope, 
but simply attempting to bring it under control by means of reinterpretation. Yet that 
imposition, and the layering of selves which results, can only obscure. It is not any 
illusory “original” which has been lost but a manifest sense of the “spots of time” as an 
active, fructifying source of imaginative restoration. In trying to control interpretation 






Coda: The Anxiety of Design 
In comparison to the other spots of time, the famous ascent of Mount Snowdon 
has a relatively stable structural location and function in all versions of The Prelude: it 
was designed to serve as a climax, and it remains a climax in all manuscripts after the 
interim Five Book Prelude of 1804. Even its precise location within the text—at the onset 
of the concluding book—remains the same across all versions. In a poem subject to 
almost constant change, this is no mean feat: indeed, the ascent of Snowdon is perhaps 
The Prelude’s only fixed spot. Yet within that set space and location, Snowdon is more 
protean, more heavily altered and rewritten (at least between 1805 and 1850) than any 
other passage in the Prelude. As the editors of the Norton Prelude put it, “None of the 
other great passages of The Prelude—indeed of Wordsworth’s poetry as a whole—
suffered in revision as did the Ascent of Snowdon. From the earliest reworkings . . . to 
the final concession to orthodoxy . . . alterations are consistently for the worse” (461). 
This raises an important question: Snowdon has the most clearly defined function 
and the most constant location of any “spot of time.” It stands to reason that it ought to be 
relatively free from (or perhaps “above”?) the semantic torsion visited upon the other 
spots by means of relocation and retasking. Why, then, was this passage so repeatedly 
and heavily revised? 
The preceding discussion suggests an answer: the greater the narrative, structural, 
or semantic pressure on the spot, the greater the poet’s anxiety. For Wordsworth, the 
spots are defining moments or loci of poetic identity. As the grand climax of the poem, 
Snowdon therefore has a more pivotal role in the figuring or construction of Wordsworth-





the greatest potential to alter the idea of the poet which emerges from the poem and is the 
final justification of his power, his priority, and his autonomy as a creative consciousness. 
For this reason, it bears the brunt of Wordsworth’s anxiety—indeed, is the representative 
climax of that anxiety. All of Wordsworth’s writing selves converge on this moment and 
struggle for ascendency. The result is a passage which is so heavily revised that it loses 
almost all of its initial meaning. This is not simply a question of a noticeable decline in 
quality, but of a manifest anxiety which distorts the very point of the sequence as a 
whole. Each respective Wordsworth attempts to accomplish his own “apocalypse of the 
imagination,” and the result is not a passage which expresses the dominance of mind over 
nature but a sequence which illustrates the internecine conflict between disparate selves 
who are successively demolishing and obliterating previous readings. The point of the 
passage, by its own admission, is to both justify and depict (via the resonant image of a 
“mighty mind”) the authority, autonomy, and ultimate creative potential of the poetic 
mind. The problem is that Wordsworth has taken his own message quite literally with 
each successive reading: the text too is something which must be subverted to the 
authority of the current poetic self. And in the attempt to swerve from those 
representative poetic precursors (a psycho-rhetorical motion rendered hyperbolic due to 
the passage’s semantic heft), Wordsworth creates a misreading which is so drastically 
different that it can no longer perform its intended function. The poetry no longer “fits”: 
the text has been folded upon itself too many times, and the resulting lines and fractures 
cannot be effaced.  
On the whole, these lines and fractures evince patterns of misreading similar to 





1805 to 1850 Snowdon sequence Wordsworth’s “self-conscious self-consciousness” is 
even more acute, as one finds him, for example, worrying openly about his poetic legacy. 
Thus the “higher” or poetic minds described in the sequence are, by 1850, 
         . . . made more prompt 
     To hold fit converse with the spiritual world, 
     And with generations of mankind 
     Spread over time, past, present, and to come, 
     Age after age, till Time shall be no more. (1850 14.107-11) 
 
Of course, the absence of such reflections on posterity in 1805 isn’t terribly surprising: at 
the time of his later revisions, Wordsworth was closer to death and thus more prone to 
consider how he might be remembered. Nevertheless, the interposition of this auxiliary 
anxiety significantly alters the character of the passage. A similar sentiment is found in 
the lines which close the 1805 Snowdon sequence, but what was a positive slant upon 
posterity has become (in 1850) an especially urgent question which reaches back toward 
the very origins of The Prelude and the Poet himself: 
     Where is the favored being who hath held 
     That course unchecked, unerring, and untired, 
     In one perpetual progress smooth and bright?— 
     A humbler destiny have we retraced, 
     And told of lapse and hesitating choice, 
     And backward wanderings along thorny ways: 
     Yet—compassed round by mountain solitudes, 
     Within whose solemn temple I received 
     My earliest visitations, careless then 
     Of what was given me; and which now I range, 
     A meditative, oft a suffering man—. (1850 14.133-43) 
 
Here, Wordsworth essentially de-idealizes the “favored being” whose development was 
the Prelude’s point of origin and still is, in many senses, the basis of the poem’s personal 
mythology. Instead of positioning himself as one divinely ordained, Wordsworth recounts 





own steps by means of “backwards wanderings along thorny ways.” One might argue that 
this thinly-veiled account of the writing of the poem itself is more honest than the 
mythologized version—and I cannot disagree. However, the most integral fact about this 
passage is that it represents yet another “layering” of consciousness: a meta- which has 
metastasized and thus formed another frame of interpretation. Wordsworth’s final 
“swerve” is a further movement away from, and defense against, the ecstatic character of 
that former “favored being.” Nothing could make this more evident than the 1850’s 
conspicuous excision of a line which, in previous versions, held immense significance. 
Formerly, Wordsworth had described himself as a “meditative, oft a suffering man,” but 
this suffering was offset in the following line: “And yet I trust with undiminished 
powers” (1805 13.126-7). In 1850, the latter line does not exist. Wordsworth leaves his 
Poet a “meditative, oft a suffering man” and, while subsequent passages will attempt to 
recoup this loss, the lingering echoes of diminishment never completely fade. 
 Yet there is another anxiety at work in the Snowdon sequence—one which cannot 
be completely subsumed or described by means of an “anxiety of influence.” It is related 
to the latter, even dependent upon it, but the two cannot be conflated. Briefly described, 
this second anxiety is that which emerges when one looks beyond the bounds of The 
Prelude and toward the body of Wordsworth’s poetry. It is a consequence of the fact that 
Wordsworth does not simply want to write a Poet’s autobiography, but to put that Poet to 
work in myriad other capacities. The “anxiety of influence” works from within; what I 
would like to call “the anxiety of design” spirals outward from The Prelude to subsume 





evidence of its existence in a famous passage from Wordsworth’s 1815 Preface to The 
Excursion:  
     Several years ago, when the Author retired to his native mountains with the hope of  
     being enabled to construct a literary work that might live, it was a reasonable thing  
     that he should take a review of his own mind, and examine how far Nature and  
     Education had qualified him for such an employment. As subsidiary to this  
     preparation, he undertook to record, in verse, the origin and progress of his own  
     powers, as far as he was acquainted with them. That work, addressed to a dear friend,  
     most distinguished for his knowledge and genius, and to whom the Author's intellect  
     is deeply indebted, has been long finished; and the result of the investigation which  
     gave rise to it, was a determination to compose a philosophical Poem, containing  
     views of Man, Nature, and Society, and to be entitled the 'Recluse'; as having for its  
     principal subject the sensations and opinions of a poet living in retirement. The  
     preparatory poem is biographical, and conducts the history of the Author's mind to the  
     point when he was emboldened to hope that his faculties were sufficiently matured for  
     entering upon the arduous labour which he had proposed to himself; and the two       
     works have the same kind of relation to each other, if he may so express himself, as  
     the Ante-chapel has to the body of a Gothic church. Continuing this allusion, he may  
     be permitted to add, that his minor pieces, which have been long before the public,  
     when they shall be properly arranged, will be found by the attentive reader to have  
     such connection with the main work as may give them claim to be likened to the little  
     cells, oratories, and sepulchral recesses, ordinarily included in those edifices. (Prose  
     3:5) 
 
Such an immense and sprawling design—and this, in addition to (or as an extension of) 
The Prelude’s own schema—could hardly fail to yield an anxiety of its own. What’s 
more, this anxiety of design and the “anxiety of influence” are bound to clash and 
interpenetrate: two discursive forces so titanic could hardly miss one another. 
Both of these anxieties result in discernable, substantial, and even drastic 
revisions to The Prelude. Further, they are complementary, one working from within and 
one from without, but both exerting pressure upon the poet and poem to reconstruct his 
past in the textual present. In order to attain a thorough picture of Wordsworth’s 
revisionary processes, one would need to follow both of them, ascertain how they collude 





corpus. For now, such an effort is outside the bounds of this study and shall have to be 
put on hold. But it remains a work in progress, as I think it ought to be. Wordsworth’s 
poetry does not easily permit closure, and neither should his critics. The effort to 
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